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THE CONTRACTS PROVISIONS OF THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND): AN ANALYSIS
AND A CRITIQUE
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
INTRODUCTION

It is standard practice to refer to contracts as "the most complex and
confused area of choice of law problems,"' and the drafters of the Restatement

(Second) are no exception. In their view:
This complexity results in part from the wide uses of contracts,
the lawyer's universal tool in business and personal affairs. This
complexity is increased by the many different kinds of contracts and
of issues involving contracts and by the many relationships a single

contract may have to two or more states.2

On the other hand, Professor Ehrenzweig, a severe and indefatigable critic
of the new Restatement,8 maintains that the confusion "is one of language

rather than substance," and is the product of "that brief conceptualistic era
which found comfort in dogmatic formulas based on 'first principles of legal

thinking."'- He contends that in practice courts have followed "true rules"
in contract cases, as in all others, 5 and that these "true rules" are reflected
in a "rule of validity" as between parties of equal bargaining power," protection
of the adherent where bargaining power is unequal, 7 and application of the law
of the forum with respect to incidents of the contract.8 Whether or not one
agrees with Professor Ehrenzweig's view that the case law supports his conclusion as to the "true rule,"9 I think that he has indeed hit upon the source
of the confusion: the attempt to resolve conflicts problems in terms of analytical
doctrine rather than with reference to the practice of the courts in dealing with
real controversies. If this is so, the contracts provisions of the Second Restate* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B., J.D., University of Pittsburgh.
1. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CoFLiqcr OF LAws 263 & n.1 (1971).
2. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNw) OF CoxFicr OF LAWS, Introductory Note to ch. 8, at 557
(1971) [hereinafter cited as IESTATEM6CENT (SEcOND)].
3. See Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its With-

drawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230 (1965) ; Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in Its
Historical Perspective: Should the Restatement Be Continued, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 133

(1954).

.EHRFNzwEIG, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS 453 (1962).
5. Id. at 307-09. See generally Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A
"Restatenent" of the "Lex Fori Approach," 18 O1.A. L. REv. 340 (1965) ; Ehrenzweig,
Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rules," 49 CAinw. L. REv. 240 (1961).
6. A. EHxrENzWEmG, supranote 4, at 466-67.
7. Id. at 454-58.
8. Id. at 490.
9. For the observation that it does not, at least with respect to the Statute of
Frauds, see Currie, Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frjids:An Inquirv into the "Rle of
Validatio," I8OmA. L. Rzv. 243 (1965),
4.
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ment will not help to remedy the confusion and may even serve to compound
it by substituting one set of terminological abstractions for another.
The general conception of the Restatement (Second), as distinguished
from the original Restatement, is that conflicts problems will best be resolved
by a combination of several broad, flexible rules that are "fluid in operation"
and a "large number of relatively narrow rules that will be applicable only in
precisely defined situations."1 ° The contracts rules, which apparently were
the most difficult to formulate, 1 ' follow this model closely. There are two "basic
rules," application of which depends upon whether the parties have attempted
to make an express choice of law, and a series of specific rules applying the
basic provisions to particular kinds of contracts and particular issues. 12 Under
section 187 the parties are permitted to choose the governing law, subject to
certain limitations. Where the parties have not made an effective choice of
law, section 188 applies, and it provides that their rights and duties "are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the
principles stated in § 6." 13 Section 6 sets forth what may be called underlying
choice-of-law principles. 14 While all of these principles are potentially applicable
to contract cases, the most important ones in such a context are likely to be
the protection of justified expectations and the promotion of certainty, predictability and uniformity of result.15 The factual contacts to be taken into
account under section 188 in applying the principles of section 6 to determine
the state of the most significant relationship include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

the place of contracting,
the place of negotiation of the contract,
the place of performance,
the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties. 16

These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
10. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoD.
679, 681 (1963). Compare RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) §§ 186-88 with §§ 189-220.
11. See Reese, Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, 9 INT'L
& Comp. L.Q. 531, 533-34 (1960).
12. See notes 18-30 infra and accompanying text.
13. The Restatement generally excludes consideration of the chosen state's conflict
rules. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 8, comments a-1, at 22-30.

I have contended that where the state whose law is sought to be used as a model would
decide the very case in accordance with the forum's substantive law, the forum ought not
to displace its law. See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: JudicialMethod and the
Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27, 95-101 (1967).

14. In the rare event that there is a statutory directive as to choice of law, the forum
must, of course, follow it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6(1) and Explanatory Notes
§ 6(1), comments a and b, at 11; Oxford Consumer Discount Co. v. Stefanelli, 102 N.J.
Super. 549, 564, 246 A2d 460, 468 (1968). See also note 253 infra.
15. See Reese, supra note 10, at 697. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 188, comments b-f. at 576-83.

16. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)

§ 188(2).
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respect to the particular issue. If, however, the place of negotiation and the
place of performance are in the same state, that state is ordinarily considered
17
to have the most significant relationship to the contract.
After setting forth in section 186 the basic principle that the law chosen
by the parties or-in the absence of an effective choice-the law of the state
having the most significant relationship will govern the contract,18 the Restatement proceeds to consider specific kinds of agreements to which this
general standard applies. For each type of contract, a detailed rule is laid
down in the form of a presumption that a particular locality will in fact be
found to have the most significant relationship.19 These presumptions are,
however, qualified with the proviso: "unless, with respect to the particular
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in §6 to the transaction and the parties .... ,20 The Restatement then

elaborates upon the issues that are to be determined by the basic principle of
section 186: capacity to contract,2 1 formalities, 22 essential validity,23 the effect
of misrepresentation, duress, undue influence and mistake, 24 illegality,25 the
nature and extent of obligations2 6 and the measure of recovery. 27 Usurious

contracts are treated separately 23 There are also special rules as to the law
determining the construction of words used in the contract 2 9 and the details
of performance.3 0
17. Id. § 188(3). Exceptions to this rule may be found in the instance of the special
types of contracts covered in sections 189-97 and situations in which validity is at issue
under section 198(2) (a party has contractual capacity under the law of his domicile),
section 199(2) (the formalities satisfy the requirements of the place of execution), and
section 203 (rule of validation in usury defenses).
18. Section 186 in turn refers to the rules of sections 187 and 188.
19. These may be summarized as follows:
(1) Land contracts-the law of the situs. 9H 189-90.
(2) Contracts to sell interests in chattels-the place of delivery. § 191.
(3) Life insurance contracts-the domicile of the insured. § 192.
4 Contracts of fire, surety, or casualty insurance-the principal location of the
insured risk. § 193.
(5) Contracts of suretyship-the law governing the principal obligation. § 194.
(6) Contracts for the repayment of money-the place of repayment. § 195.
(7) Contracts for the rendition of services-the place where the major portion of the
services are to be rendered. § 196.
(8) Contracts of transportation-place of departure or dispatch. § 197.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 189-97.
21. Id. § 198. (When the party has capacity under the law of his domicile, his capacity
will be upheld.)
22. Id. § 199. (Formalities that meet the requirements of the place where the parties
execute the contract will usually be acceptable.)
23. Id. § 200.
24. Id. § 201.
25. Id. § 202. (When performance is illegal in the place of performance, the contract
will usually be denied enforcement.)

26. Id. § 205.
27. Id. § 207.
28. Id. § 203. They will be discussed independently in this article. See notes 216-79
infra and accompanying text.
29. Id. § 204. The forum is directed first to try to determine the actual intention of
the parties. If this fails, the contract is to be construed in accordance with the basio
rule, i.e.,
the law chosen or the law of the state of the most significant relationship.
30. Id. § 206. The details of performance are determined by the law of the place of
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According to Professor Reese, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second),
the contracts provisions incorporate four major changes from the original
Restatement. First, "perhaps the most important change" is that the parties
are now given wide power to choose the law that will govern the validity
of their contract.3' Second, in the absence of an effective choice by the parties,
"the validity of a contract is no longer subjected inevitably and unalterably
to the law of the place of contracting," but instead is governed by the law
of the state to which it has the most significant relationship.8 2 Third, the first
Restatement "laid down rules applicable to the entire field of contracts and
made no attempt to distinguish between particular kinds of contracts," whereas
the Restatement (Second) "proceeds to discuss particular kinds of contracts
where it is possible to state on the basis of existing knowledge that, in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, a given contract will be
given greatest weight in the selection of the State of the governing law. 8 8
The fourth major change is that the new Restatement makes no sharp distinction between matters of validity and matters of performance, looking in both
instances to the same law except for the details of performance.P
Professor Reese has ably and effectively stated the justification for the
Second Restatement's approach to contracts, particularly in comparison to
an approach based upon interest analysisP5 or one based upon a rule of validation. 6 It seems appropriate in the present article to set out this justification
fully in the words of Professor Reese:
Experience has shown that this large and complicated area cannot
adequately be handled by a few single rules. What is needed instead
is a large number of rules that are each directed to a relatively narrow
situation. Experience to date is not sufficient to permit the formulation of many such rules at the present time .... It would, of course,
be far easier if it were possible to say that consideration need be
given to only one of the relevant policies, as that a court should
apply its own law when to do so would further a local interest or,
in order to protect the expectations of the parties, should apply a law
which will validate the contract. Such a view, however, would vastly
oversimplify the problem and would probably prove to be as incorrect
performance. See id., Explanatory Notes § 206, comment b, at 669-70 (examples of what

constitute "details of performance" within the meaning
There are also special topics on Assignment of
Discharge (§§ 212-13), Negotiable Instruments (§§
(§§ 218-20), and Restitution (§ 221). These areas as
present article.
31. Reese, supra note 11, at 534.
32. Id. at 537.
33. Id. at 538.

of this rule).
Contractual Rights (§§ 208-11),
214-17), Commercial Arbitration
such will not be discussed in the

34. Id. at 539-40. The special rule as to usury, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

§ 203, is

also a departure from the approach of the original Restatement, which laid down no
special rule in this area, thus treating usury in the same manner as any other issue

going to the validity of the contract.

35. See, e.g., B. CuRuux, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CoNFLirc OF LAWS ch. 2 (1963).

36. See, e.g., A. EHRENZwEIG, supra note 4, at 467-90; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note
1, at 292.
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as the equally simple, and much criticized, rule of the original Restatement that the validity of a contract is governed by the law of the place
of contracting.
There is no easy short cut. In each case, all of the policies must
be considered and a choice-of-law rule developed that will give effect
to what are the most important policies for the precise purpose at
hand. It is felt as a result that the Restatement cannot usually do
more in the case of contracts which contain no choice-of-law provision
than to state the general principle of state of most significant relationship in the black letter rule and then to mention in the comments the
more important considerations that should motivate the courts in
arriving at a decision and in general to give whatever guidance is
possible. At the very least, such black letter rules and comments will
not mislead an unwary court or litigant into believing that the area

is governed by well-settled rulesyt
Whatever may be their deficiencies, the contract rules of the Restatement

(Second) do not lack well-reasoned and articulate justification.
Nor, on the other hand, do they lack critics. Professor Ehrenzweig has
said:
The Second Restatement formula can be used to support virtually
any result and is thus bound to hamper the sound development of the
common law by saving the court the difficult but necessary effort of
articulating those true motivations
which are of course the very ele23
ments of growing rules.
In referring to the chapter on contracts as indicative of the Second Restatement's general approach, Professor Cavers has observed:
Most evident, I believe, is the want of a consistent conception of the
choice-of-law problem. The impression grows that each section of the
old Restatement has been read in the light of the supervening cases,
and the old provisions cast out, modified, or left intact as the opinions,
taken at face value, seemed to require. .

.

.But in this period of

changing ideas and interests, naturally the impact of the cases has
been erratic. In Restatement Second, the result of reflecting them has
been an erratic pattern, one lacking in internal coherence but nonetheless providing
openings for imaginative, articulate courts to exploit
in the future 3 9

And in his recent treatise, Professor Weintraub has voiced strong criticisms
of the Second Restatement's approach to express choice of law4" and to the
concept of the state of the most significant relationship as "governing law." 41
I propose in this article to analyze the contracts provisions of the Restatement (Second)-and choice-of-law questions in the field of contracts generally
37. Reese, supra note 10, at 697-99.

38. Ehrenzweg, The Second Conflicts Restatement, supra note 3, at 1241.
39. CAVERs, RE-RESTATING THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS: THE CHAPTER ONT CoNTRAcTs,
in xxr CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 349, 364 (1961).
40. P, WErNTRAuB, supra note 1, at 273-75.

41. Id. at 276-80.
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-from the perspective of what I have called "judicial method and the policycentered conflict of laws." This methodology, which I have elaborated more
fully elsewhere,42 may be summarized briefly as follows: (1) The basic law is
the law of the forum; it will be applied in the absence of considerations
requiring its displacement by the law of another state. (2) The court should
in each instance determine whether such displacement is warranted with
reference to the fact-law pattern of the case at bar. (3) Displacement should
occur only when application of the forum's law either would defeat the
legitimate expectations of the parties or would violate the interests of states
that, under the circumstances presented, the forum should recognize. 4 This
system has its genesis in the methodology of interest analysis developed by
Professor Currie. 4 Although I have thus far utilized this approach primarily
in the context of torts cases, I believe that it is equally relevant to contracts
issues.
In terms of its methodology and orientation, the "policy-centered conflict
of laws" is directly antithetical to the "rules" approach of the Restatement
(Second). The emphasis of policy analysis on the law of the forum as the
basic law and on the responsibility of the court to decide the case in light of
its particular law-fact pattern is at odds with the Restatement's notion that,
irrespective of the forum in which they are brought, all cases should be decided
in the same way through correct application of the designated "rule." It is
particularly significant in this connection that the Restatement discusses all
questions from the vantage point of a "disinterested third state." 45 In practice,
however, few cases arise in a purely disinterested forum. A basic premise of
interest analysis is that the result in a given case may well depend upon the
forum in which the action is filed, since the application of the forum's law is
the only rational method by which a true conflict can be resolved. 46
My own view of the Restatement (Second) is not a sympathetic one, and
my earlier contention that it has substituted "many complex rules" for the
"few simple ones" of the original Restatement,47 would seem to be particularly
borne out in contracts provisions. More importantly, its "rules methodology"
is inconsistent with an analysis of conflicts problems in terms of policy and
42. See Sedler, supra note 13; Sedler, Characterization,Identification of the Problem
Area, and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2
R T.-CAm.

L.I. 8 (1970).

43. See Sedler, Conflict of Laws: Round Table Symposium, 49 TEx. L. Rzv. 224

(1971).

44. The conflicts field changes so rapidly that it is possible to refer to the "traditional
interest analysis" developed by Professor Currie. See generally B. CuaRrm, supra note 35.
I differ with Professor Currie only in regard to distinguishing between "real" and
"hypothetical" interests, and that difference will not frequently be significant. See Sedler,
supra note 43, at 225.
45. See Reese, supra note 10, at 692-93; cf. Currie, The Disinterested Third State,
28 LAw & CoNTEmp. P oB. 754 (1963).
46. See B. Cunmu, supra note 35, at 181-82.
47. Sedler, supra note 13, at 41.
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fairness. Despite protestations to the contrary, 48 the basic concept underlying
the Restatement denies to the courts a creative role in the development on a
case-by-case basis of sound conflicts doctrine. The following observations,
made previously in connection with the Second Restatement's approach to tort
cases, are equally applicable to its treatment of contracts questions:
As with the original Restatement, it represents an externallyestablished system for the solution of all conflicts problems. It is
granted that the rules of the Restatement Second are more flexible and
in some respects seem to carry policy overtones. It is also granted
that in deciding to prefer the Restatement Second over the original
Restatement, courts may stress some policy considerations. Nonetheless, the approach is still one of a complete system of rules designed
to solve all cases of a particular category. 49
Therefore, while the rules of the Restatement Second may be
more flexible (and more complex) and permit some consideration of
policy, the system, nonetheless, is one of rules.6 0 Courts should "leap
the bridge" from the system of rules approach to the policy-centered
approach rather than "cross the bridge" from the "few simple rules"
of the original Restatement to the "many complex" rules of the
Restatement Second. In doing so they should also return to the
judicial method of decision and accept responsibility for the development of a body of conflicts law.51
In the contracts area the approach of "judicial method and the policycentered conflict of laws" must take into account both the possibility of reliance
on the law of a particular state by the parties and the common policy of all
states to protect the legitimate expectations of the parties in commercial and
consensual transactions. Moreover, unlike most rules of substantive tort law,
particular rules of substantive contract law may not in themselves represent
any strong policy beyond the general one of enforcing contracts and protecting
the parties' expectations. A contract rule, for example, that makes a contract
by mail complete upon the posting of the acceptance by the offeree rather than
upon its receipt by the offeror would seem to represent, not any strong government policy, but only an effort to let the parties know when such a contract is
complete. In contrast, a rule prohibiting the charging of usurious rates of
interest would appear to represent a very strong policy imposing limits on
48. Reese, supra note 10, at 680-82, 697-99.

49. If, as Professor Ehrenzweig suggests, the rules are so broad that they can be
used to support any result, then the SECOND RESTATEMENT can best be characterized as
an approach of "no rules at all." See The Second Conflicts Restatement, supra note 3,
at 1241-42.
50. This is particularly evident in subsection (3) of section 188 (when place of
negotiation and place of performance are in the same state, the law of that state will
usually be applied) and in the comments to the corresponding tort rule of section 145
(when injury occurred in a single, clearly ascertainable state and when the conduct that
caused the injury also occurred there, that state's law will be applied to most issues
concerning the tort). See RESTATEmENT (SECOND), .Explanatory Notes § 145, comment e,
at 420.
51. Sedler, supra note 13, at 61-63 (footnotes added).
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parties' "freedom to contract." The Statute of Frauds would come somewhere
in between. Where a strong policy is not involved and there may have been
reliance on the law of a particular state, the displacement of the forum's law
may well be proper. Nontheless, a rule--no matter how broadly (or precisely)
framed--cannot be a substitute for judicial consideration not only of all facets
of the problem presented in a particular case but also of the policies and
interests of the concerned states and the requirements of fairness to the
parties. 52 It is my belief that courts should make decisions in contract cases,
as in all others, with reference to considerations of policy and fairness and that
these decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis.
In the present article, I shall discuss the basic choice-of-law issues in
contract cases, using the framework adopted by the Restatement: (1) the
power of the parties to choose the applicable law; (2) determination of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice; and (3) choice of law in
claims of usury. In so doing I will analyze the Restatement's approach and
relate it to my own view as to how the matters should be dealt with under
a policy-centered approach to conflict of laws. 53
I.
A.

ExPRiss CHoIcE oF LAW

Matters Within the Contractual Capacity of the Parties

The Restatement distinguishes at the outset between matters that are
within the contractual capacity of the parties and those that are not. As to the
former, full party autonomy is recognized under section 187(1), which
provides:
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which
the parties could have resolved
by an explicit provision in their agree4
ment directed to that issue.
I agree fully with this view. When the parties say that the law of a particular
state "governs" with respect to matters that they could have covered in the
contract, they are merely incorporating by reference the provisions of that law
into the terms of their agreement. The so-called express choice of law is merely
a shorthand way of doing so, and its effect is the same as if the chosen state's
statutes and judicial decisions on that point had been explicitly written in.
52. For a discussion of this question in regard to the law of property, see id. at 106.
53. Under section 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code the parties are given the
power to choose the applicable law. In the absence of such choice, the forum is directed
to apply its version of the code if the transaction "bears an appropriate relation" to the
forum. As to what constitutes an "appropriate relation," see Skinner v. Tober Foreign

Motors, Inc., 345 Mass. 429, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963). As to choice of law under the
Uniform Commercial Code, see generally R. WErNTRAuB, supra note 1, at 270-71, 280-81

Nordstrom & Ramerman, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Choice of Law, 1969
DuE LJ. 623.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187(1).
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Suppose, for example, that the parties to a contract, in a clause setting forth
the conditions excusing performance (such as "fire, flood, labor disputes, etc."),
also include the phrase "or other circumstances beyond the control of the
parties." A dispute arises as to whether non-performance due to unfavorable
business conditions is a valid excuse. The parties could have covered this
contingency in their contract, but they did not. However, they did provide that
the contract was to be "governed" by Michigan law. Under Michigan "contract
construction" law, the phrase "other circumstances beyond the control of the
parties" is limited to the kinds of events specifically named in the main body of
the clause, so that here it would not include unfavorable business conditions.
By providing that Michigan law governs on this point, the parties have done
no more than incorporate by reference that part of Michigan law that says,
in effect, unfavorable business conditions are not included.5 5 In such a case,
no genuine choice-of-law issue is presented, and, as the Restatement recognizes, there should be no limitation on the power of the parties to incorporate
foreign law into their contract.5 6
The courts, in dealing with choice-of-law clauses, do not always distinguish between matters within the contractual capacity of the parties and
matters beyond their capacity. Moreover, they sometimes treat choice of law
as to issues within contractual capacity as though it involved a conflict of laws
problem. A good example of this confusion is the "carriage by sea" case of
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd.57 An American on a journey from
New York to France was injured while a passenger on a ship of British
registry. The steamship ticket, which was considered to be a contract,58 contained a "built-in" statute of limitations barring the initiation of any suit for
personal injuries more than one year from the date of injury. It also provided
that "all questions arising on this contract shall be decided according to
English law with reference to which this contract is made." One-year "built-in
limitations" were valid under both American 9 and English law.o Suit was
brought in New York after the one-year period had expired, but the plaintiff
claimed that the company's agent had waived the limitation provision by
assuring the plaintiff that suit would not be necessary. 61 Under English law
55. See Buono Sales, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 363 F2d 43, 47 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966).
56. See R. WETrAuB, supra note 1, at 293. This is somewhat analogous to the
use of foreign law as datum to determine factual questions made necessary by the applica-

tion of the forum's law. See generally Kay, Conflict of Laws: Foreign Law as Datum,
53 CALiF. L. REv. 47 (1965).
57. 221 F2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
58. It was called a "contract ticket" and was 13 X 11 inches in size. See 221 F2d
at 190-91. The document is reproduced in full in id. at 208-10.
59. See 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1970).
60. See 221 F2d at 194.
61. Paragraph 11 of the contract provided that the agreement could not be altered
except by a writing signed by the company's chief agent at the port of embarkation. In
view of the approach that the court took, it was not necessary to decide whether that
provision was valid under English law. Id. at 198.
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the conduct of the agent would not amount to a waiver, and it was assumed
that American law was to the contrary. The court held that English law applied
as the law chosen by the parties. Although treating the issue as one "involving
the circumstances under which parties may be said to have partially rescinded
their agreements or to be barred from enforcing them," the court surprisingly
went on to say that it was "more closely akin to a question of validity."" 2 ItI
still allowed English law to govern, but rested its decision on the assumption
that express choice of law was permitted even as to matters beyond the contractual capacity of the parties. judge Frank dissented on the ground that it
was uncertain whether the choice-of-law provision was intended to govern
the "post-injury conduct" of Cunard's agent in offering a settlement 3 and that,
because of this ambiguity, the clause should be construed most narrowly
against the party who had authored it.64 He went on to contend in dictum
that the express choice of law should be denied recognition on the further
ground that the contract as a whole was one of adhesion, "a standardized or
mass-production agreement, with one-sided control of its terms."05
It seems that both the majority and the dissent misunderstood what was
involved. The contract could have specifically provided, "And no agent of the
company by any act whatsoever shall have the power to waive the one-year
period." By providing that English law governed on this issue, the parties
were merely doing the same thing in a shorthand way. Therefore, it was not
necessary for the majority to discuss express choice of law as to matters
beyond the contractual capacity of the parties. 0 The position taken by the
dissent is no more satisfactory. So long as the courts continue to enforce
adhesion contracts in other respects, there can be no justification for refusing
to give effect to an incorporation by reference of this sort.67 There was no
claim that the validity of the agreement as a whole was impaired. Neither was
there any reason to believe that the selection of England as the state of governing law was itself unconscionable or oppressive.08 This being the case, the
defendant cannot be faulted for its reliance upon English law to govern its
conduct during the settlement negotiations.
An especially valuable contrast may be drawn between Siegelinan and the
case of Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co.00 In the latter, a German national, who
could not read English, purchased a ticket in Germany for a roundtrip to the
United States. The ticket, written wholly in English, provided that American
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

195.
201.
202.
204.

66. By doing so the court set a precedent, and the opinion is a casebook favorite.
See R. CRAmTON & B. CuRm, CONFLICT OF LAWs 150 (1968); W. REESE & M.
ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS

67. Cf. notes 83-90 infra and accompanying text.

68. See 221 F2d at 195-96.
69. 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

612 (6th ed. 1971).
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law was to govern and contained a one-year "built-in limitation." It was
contended that such a provision would be invalid under German law. 70 The
court refused to recognize the choice-of-law provision on the ground that
this was an adhesion contract and, since the plaintiff could not read English,
she could not have intended to make an express choice of law. It distinguished
Siegelman on this basis and indicated that, if the contract had been written in
German and the plaintiff had understood its terms, she would have been bound
by the choice-of-law provision.71 Here too, it is submitted, the court was in
error. The matter in dispute went to the validity of the "built-in limitation,"
a matter analytically beyond the contractual capacity of the parties, and it is
well-settled that the validity of contractual provisions limiting tort liability
cannot be controlled by an express choice of law.72 If the contract in Siegelman
had provided for only a six-month period in which suit could have been
brought, there can be no doubt that the express choice of a law validating such
a provision would not have been recognized.73 It is thus clear that the court in
Fri ke had no need to distinguish Siegelman on grounds of "adhesion" or
"strong policy." As will be pointed out in subsequent discussion,7 4 the result
in Fricke need not have turned upon the inability of the plaintiff to assent to a
provision that she could not understand. Rather, the choice-of-law provision
-insofar as it attempted to speak to the validity of a limitation on liabilityshould have been disregarded because the party's home state had an interest
in implementing its strong policy of allowing tort recovery despite contractual
provisions to the contrary. Siegelman, where the choice-of-law provision was
addressed to a question wholly within the discretion of the parties, was a different matter entirely.
So long as the issue involves a matter within the contractual capacity of
the parties, any attempt to resolve that issue by incorporating the law of a
particular state by reference should be fully recognized. It should not matter
that the contract itself was an adhesive one or even that one party could not
read it-so long as we enforce adhesion contracts generally and so long as we
do not require that a party be able to read a contract if he has objectively manifested his consent. 75 Incorporation, by reference, of foreign law as to matters
70. The case arose on the defendant's motion for summary judgment made in reliance
upon American law. Thus, the plaintiff's view with respect to the effect of German law
was accepted as proven. Id. at 468.

71. Id.
72. In Ocean Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F2d 724 (2d Cir. 1925), for
example, American law, which invalidated a contractual provision requiring claims to
be filed within three days of any accident, was applied in the case of an American
passenger injured aboard a British vessel, notwithstanding an express choice of English

law.

73. See The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263 (1902) ; A. EERENZWEIG, supra note 4, at
534-35; cf. Pisacane v. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione, 219 F. Supp. 424
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Caruso v. Italian Line, 184 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
74. See notes 99-120 infra and accompanying text.
75. See 1 S. WMLIszoN, CONTRACrS § 35 (3d ed. Jaeger 1957). But see Silvestri v.
Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione, 388 F2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968).
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within the contractual capacity of the parties does not involve a choice-of-law
problem-a point that is reinforced by the provisions of section 187(1).76
MattersBeyond the ContractualCapacity of the Parties

B.

Under section 187(2) express choice of law is recognized "even if the
particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit
provision in their agreement." There are, however, three exceptions, when:
(1) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
7
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice; 7
(2) the consent of one of the parties to the inclusion of the provision was
secured by misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or mistake;78 or (3) application of the law chosen would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state
that has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination
of the particular issue and such other state would, in the absence of an effective
choice, be the state of the most significant relationship under section 188Y
The justification for permitting choice of law as to matters beyond the
contractual capacity of the parties has been stated by the drafters of the
Restatement (Second) as follows:
Prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified
expectations of the parties and to make it possible for them to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities under the
contract. These objectives may best be attained in multistate transactions by letting the parties choose the law to govern the validity of
the contract and the rights created thereby. In this way, certainty and
predictability of result are most likely to be secured. Giving parties
this power of choice is also consistent with the fact that, in contrast
to other areas of the law, persons are free within broad limits to
determine the nature of their contractual obligations 80
It is difficult to dispute the contention that permitting the parties expressly to
choose the governing law serves these objectives, although, as Professor
Weintraub contends, they would be better served by validating the contract
"whenever it is reasonable to do so irrespective of whether or not the parties
have made an express choice of validating law."81
1. Reasonableness Requirement. In any event, the crucial question is
what limitations will be placed upon the power of the parties to choose the
76. See

RESTATEMENT

77. Id. § 187(2) (a).

(SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 187, comment c, at 563-64.

78. This exception isincluded inthe comments rather than inthe text. See RESTATE(SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 187, comment b, at 562. An earlier draft included
itinthe text. Id. § 332a (Tent.Draft No.6,1960).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187(2) (b). Itisstated that the exceptions do not
apply "when all contacts are located in a single state and when, as a consequence, there
MENT

is only one interested state." Id., Explanatory Notes § 187, comment d, at 564.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187, comment e, at 565. It is now recognized that

allowing the parties to choose the applicable law does not give them the power to
"legislate," since their "power" to choose the law is given by the forum's choice-of-law
rule. See Reese, supra note 11, at 534.

81. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 271, 273-74.
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applicable law. The first limitation that the Restatement imposes-that the
state whose law is chosen have a substantial relationship to the contract, or
otherwise be reasonable-is not, as the drafters' comments point out, a significant one. They note that such a situation will not arise in practice, since
"[c] ontracts are entered into for serious purposes and rarely, if ever, will the
parties choose a law without good reason for doing so.''82
2. Misrepresentation,Duress, Undue Influence or Mistake. The second
limitation, going to mistake, duress and the like, raises two important questions: (1) Should the choice of law be recognized if the contract is one of
adhesion? (2) Should the choice of law be recognized if it would invalidate
the contract or a part thereof?
(A.) Choice of Law Dictated by Superior Bargaining Power. With
respect to choice-of-law provisions contained in adhesion contracts, it is important to distinguish the situation presented in a case such as Fricke from the
"ordinary adhesion" case. In the more usual situation, although the adherent
could have read the contract, it would not have mattered since the document
was a standardized form agreement and there could not have been any real
bargaining or negotiation about its terms 83 In Fricke, the inability of the
adherent to read the contract would negative any "intention" on her part to
"choose governing law." In the ordinary case, however, such an intent could
be inferred. Since adhesion agreements are generally enforced in other respects,
it could be argued that choice-of-law stipulations should be treated no differently. The Restatement takes a very guarded position here, observing that
choice of law provisions contained in adhesion contracts8 4 are usually respected,
but that, "[n] evertheless, the forum will scrutinize such contracts with care
and will refuse to apply any choice-of-law provision they may contain if to do
so would result in substantial injustice to the adherent."'8 5 And courts have
been willing to enforce such choice-of-law stipulations, at least where the
adhesive nature of the contract was due to the absence of negotiations rather
than to "unconscionability."' 6 Professor Ehrenzweig, on the other hand, contends that the principle of party autonomy has no place in the conflicts law of
standardized contracts, since "the adherent, 'having no real choice about the
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 187, comment f, at 566-67. But
see Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R.I. 162, 192 A. 158 (1937) (the court
a contract between a circus and a circus
refused to uphold a choice of Florida law in.
performer on the ground that the contract had no physical connection with Florida.
Since many circuses make their winter headquarters in Florida, Florida law was a
reasonable one for the parties to choose) ; cf. A. EiiazNzWEi, supra note 4, at 528. Of
course, if such a situation never arises in practice, it may be asked why it was necessary
to include a "rule" governing it.
83. Standardization may or may not reflect inequality of bargaining power. Insurance

contracts are standardized, often as a result of state regulation. Insurance sales are
nevertheless frequently made in a "buyer's market." The same may be true of leasing

arrangements, where the contracts also are usually standardized.
84. It does not distinguish between standardization and inequality of bargaining power.
85. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), Explanatory Notes § 187, comment b, at 562.
86. See, e.g., Boase v. Lee Rubber &Tire Corp., 437 F2d 527, 530-31 (3d Cir. 1970).
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matter, cannot in fairness be said to have joined in a "choice of law" '."87 Professor Cavers, in contrast, agrees with the Restatement's approach, observing
that choice-of-law provisions "have a value in the planning and conduct of a
business operating over a broad spectrum of states, a value independent of the
existence of a peculiarly favorable constellation of laws in the state chosen,"
so that, "[e] xcept where the provision would be harsh on the other party, a
court might well accept a choice made by adhesion."88
My position as to whether an adhesive choice of law should be recognized
cannot be separated from my view that, as to all matters beyond the parties'
contractual capacity, choice of law should be allowed only when the matter
at issue does not involve the strong policy of any of the concerned states.80
If express choice of law is so limited, I see no real objection to allowing the
express choice to operate against adherents. So long as we enforce adhesion
contracts generally, we may as well be consistent, even as to express choice of
lawY0 However, in the limited circumstances in which I would recognize an
express choice of law, enforcing those provisions against adherents is unlikely
either to work "substantial injustice" or to deprive them of important protections to which they are entitled under the law of their home state.
(B.) Choice of a Law that Invalidates the Agreement. I would also contend that an otherwise proper express choice of law should be recognized even
if it would invalidate the contract or a part thereof. The Restatement blithely
states that if the parties have chosen a law that would invalidate the contract,
it can be assumed that they did so by mistake.0 Professor Weintraub agrees
that a stipulation of invalidating law can be disregarded as an "obvious
error." 92 But is this really so? Consider a case such as A.S. Rampell, Inc. v.
Hyster Co.,0 3 in which, according to Professor Weintraub, the "law chosen by
the parties invalidated a provision in the contract." 04 Hyster was an Oregon
corporation doing business in New York; Rampell was a distributor of
Hyster's products in parts of New York and New Jersey. The dealermanufacturer relationship had existed for a number of years under written
contracts permitting either party to terminate at any time. Each of these
contracts contained a provision to the effect that the contract was to be
87. A. EHRENzWEiG, supra note 4, at 456-57, quoting from Siegelman v. Cunard
White Star, Ltd., 222 F2d 189, 206 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting). He contends
that in practice the stipulations will be upheld only where they have protected the

adherent or where, despite the standardized form, there was equality of bargaining power.
See also Nordstrom & Ramerman, supra note 53, at 630-31; R. WmNRAUn, supra note
1, at 274.
88. CAVERS, stpra note 39, at 360.
89. See notes 100-21 infra and accompanying text.
90. Professor Ehrenzweig, to the contrary, contends that courts should use the
conflicts case to set an example. A. EHRENzwEG, supra note 4, at 457-58.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 187, comment e, at 566.
92. P. W rnTRAuB, supra note 1, at 273.

93. 3 N.Y2d 369, 144 N.E2d 371, 165 N.Y.S2d 475 (1957).
94. R.WxrmrAuB, supra note 1, at 272.
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governed by Oregon law. When Hyster terminated the agreement, Rampell
sued in New York, claiming that subsequent to the execution of the last
contract, Hyster had orally agreed that it would not terminate the distributorship except "upon just cause and reasonable notice." ilyster contended that
the alleged oral modification was ineffectual because it violated the New York
Statute of Frauds. The court rejected this defense, applying Oregon law
(under which subsequent oral modifications were valid) as the law chosen by
the parties. While application of the chosen law, in effect, invalidated a portion
of the written agreement by rendering it inoperative, it upheld the oral modification. To that extent the court "gave effect to the expectations of the parties."
Clearly the parties intended to choose Oregon law to govern the contract.
Indeed, it can be argued that when they entered into the oral modification, they
relied on Oregon law to uphold the oral modification as valid. In any event,
their choice of law can hardly be termed an "obvious error."
Now consider a case such as General Electric Credit Corp. v. Beyerlein,95
in which the court applied the law chosen by the parties to invalidate a clause
cutting off the buyer's defenses against an assignee of the seller. The seller
may have made a mistake, but it does not at all follow that the buyer also did.
In fact, he may have agreed to the choice-of-law clause or even demanded its
insertion precisely because he knew that it would render unenforceable the
provision insulating the assignee. The assumption that parties always intend
to be fully bound by a contract into which they have entered is naive. Each may
want the other to be bound but may hope that he can escape obligations if he
finds it advantageous to do so. Here the buyer, by agreeing to the express
choice of law, may have intended to put himself in the position of having a
perfectly good contract that he could enforce against the seller but that could
not be enforced against him by the seller's assignee unless the assignee also
assumed the seller's obligations. Perhaps it was "unjust" for him to take advantage of the seller in this way, if this is what actually occurred; but it certainly cannot be assumed that the parties made a mutual mistake when they
chose the applicable law.
The absence of mutual mistake becomes even clearer when the choice-oflaw provision contained in an adhesion contract serves to benefit the adherent.
In Pisacanev. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione,9 6 an Italian shipping
line inserted a provision to the effect that all actions for personal injuries had
to be brought within a year from the date of the accident and another provision
that Italian law governed. The only problem was that under Italian law it
appeared that the built-in limitation period was void. 97 In Jones v. Tindall,9 8
95. 55 Misc. 2d 724, 286 N.Y.S2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
96. 219 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
97. Under Italian law it appeared that the period had to run from the time the
passenger arrived at his destination. The case came up on a motion for summary
judgment. See also Caruso v. Italian Line, 184 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). (In
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the Tennessee lender inserted a choice-of-law provision applying the law of
Arkansas, the residence of the borrower, and lo and behold, the interest rate
was usurious under Arkansas law. In both of these cases, the dominant party
did indeed make a mistake, but since the other party did not participate in the
choice of law, it is absurd to speak of mutual mistake. Moreover, it certainly
seems fair to give the dominant party the "fruits of his choice," however tart
these may prove to be.
If in a given case it can be shown that the parties actually made a mutual
mistake-as evidenced, for example, by a choice of law that would nullify the
entire agreement, and that was truly contrary to both parties' intentions-there
is justification for ignoring the express choice. But otherwise, it should be
assumed that the parties intended to do what they did and to accept the
consequences of their decision.99
3. Conflicting Governmental Policy. We now come to the Restatement's
third and most important limitation: The choice of law will not be recognized
when the "application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the ... particular issue and which, . . .in the absence of an
effective choice," would be the state of the most significant relationship. 100 The
very words used in formulating the limitation indicate an intention to circumscribe it as much as possible. It is not enough that the policy be a strong one;
it must be "fundamental." It is not enough that the state whose law would
otherwise govern under the Restatement's approach have some interest or
even a strong interest in applying its own law; that interest must be "materially
greater" than the interest of the chosen state. Finally, the other state must also
be the state of the most significant relationship. The burden here would appear
to be a formidable one indeed.
The working model on which the Second Restatement proceeds assumes
that all cases are heard in a distinterested forum. With respect to section 187,
such a forum must decide whether the "fundamental policy" of the state of the
most significant relationship is to be preferred over the law of the state chosen
by the parties. In practice, however, despite our law of transient jurisdiction,
the great majority of cases will be brought in an interested forum. Based on
this interest, the forum can constitutionally apply its own law if it so chooses. 1' 1
When the issue in question involves a strong, albeit not "fundamental policy"
of the forum, and when the forum has an interest in applying its own law to
a similar factual situation the court applied Italian law "on the merits," refusing to
recognize the express choice of law provision to that effect.)

98. 216 Ark. 431, 226 S.W2d 44 (1950).

99. See the very effective discussion with reference to the English practice in A.
DicE & J. Moius, THE CONFLICr OF LAws 708 (8th ed. 1967).
100. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 187(2) (b).
101. The application of its law must, however, be fair to the other party, and it

generally will be. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) ; cf. Home Ins,
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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implement that policy, it may be asked whether the forum will displace its law
merely because the parties have expressly chosen the law of another state. I
would submit that the forum ordinarily will not do so and that the significant
considerations affecting its decision are whether it regards the policy represented by its law to be sufficiently strong to warrant its application in such a
case and whether the application of the forum's law would be unfair to either
party. In this connection, the fact that the choice of law was secured pursuant
to an adhesion contract may be relevant when the adherent is a forum resident
who has entered into the agreement in a jurisdiction whose laws accord him
less protection than those of the forum. By the same token, even if the forum
has no real interest in the application of its own law,10 2 it is likely to treat
the choice of law expressed in the agreement from the perspective of a state
10 3
whose interests are affected by the issues at bar.
We may illustrate this point by considering a variety of situations in
which choice-of-law provisions interact with strong policies of a concerned
state-not necessarily the forum in which suit is brought. In the case of carriage-by-sea contracts, we have already noted that courts in general will not
recognize an express choice of law that has the effect of barring tort recovery
where an explicit contractual limitation on liability would be invalid under
the law of the victim's home state.' 0 4 This works both ways. If the victim is a
resident of the forum, the forum will apply its own law in disregard of any contract provision specifying the law of another state. 10 5 Even if the agreement
calls for the application of the forum's own law, a forum whose interests are
not significantly affected may still defer to the law of the victim's state of
residence.' 06 Similar results obtain in the instance of life insurance contracts.
As to this class of agreements, the Restatement concludes that the insured's
07
domicile is the state with the most significant relationship to the contract'
and that effect will frequently not be given to a choice-of-law provision that
looks to another state, since "[1]ife insurance is a matter of intense public
concern, . .. [and] a major purpose of ...legislation [in this area] is to
protect the individual insured . . . ."108 The rationale behind this rule is that

to give the insured less protection than would be extended under the law of
his domicile would in all probability "be repugnant to a fundamental policy of
the state" having the most significant relationship to the insurance contract.10 9
102. It might be a purely disinterested forum or it may conclude after a careful
analysis of policies and interests, that it lacks any real interest.
103. An analogous practice has been employed in tort cases. See, e.g., Tramontana v.
S.A. Impressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Long v.
Pan American World Airways, 16 N.Y2d 337, 213 N.E2d 796, 266 N.Y.S2d 513 (1965).
104. See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text.
105. See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F2d 724 (2d Cir. 1925).
106. See Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
107. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 192.
108. Id., Explanatory Notes § 192, comment c, at 602. The Restatement also
emphasizes the adhesive nature of insurance contracts.
109. Id., comment e, at 604.
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There can be no doubt that the courts of the insured's domicile would agree. 110
In the case of property insurance, the Restatement takes a similar position,
noting that the state of the insured's domicile would not recognize an express
choice-of-law provision displacing its law as to a contract insuring property
situated within the state."' What, it may be asked, makes the policy of protecting insureds a "fundamental" one under the rubric of section 187(2) (b) ?
In my view, the answer is obvious. The domicile has a clear interest in applying that policy for the benefit of its residents and in regulating the conduct of
companies that insure its residents or their property. This becomes particularly
evident when we consider an agreement to insure property located outside the
forum. In that situation, the interests of the forum in regulating insurance
companies are much less clear, and the application of its law might be unfair
to the insurer. An express choice of law should therefore be recognized. 112
Analogous considerations apply in all instances where contractual provisions
trench upon strong policies of the forum. Thus, the forum will not recognize
the parties' choice of law to determine the validity of a covenant not to compete
where the competition takes place in the forum and where, under its laws, such
agreements are regarded as being in restraint of trade." 8
These examples demonstrate that whether the forum will give effect to
an express choice of law displacing its own depends upon whether the issue
involves a strong policy of the forum and whether the forum has an interest
in applying its law to implement that policy in the particular case. Certain
questions analytically going to validity, such as the existence of consideration,
do not involve a strong policy.114 Here the forum would recognize an express
choice of law.115 Other matters, such as serious illegality, just as obviously
do involve a strong policy." 06 There is no doubt, as the Restatement itself
recognizes," 17 that an express choice-of-law provision cannot be employed to
defeat the policy of the forum or another interested state.
110. See Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 F2d 861, 863-65 (2d Cir. 1960)
did not involve express choice of law, the lower court's rationale would clearly serve to
(importance of insured's domicile applying its law to protect him). Although that case

invalidate any such choice.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 193, comment e, at 613.
112. See id.; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Quarty v. Insurance Co.
of North America, 244 So. 2d 181 (Fla. App. 1971).
113. See, e.g., Forney Industries, Inc. v. Andre, 246 F. Supp. 333 (D.N.D. 1965).

114. See A. EHRENzWEiG, supra note 4, at 479-80. It is significant that the Uniform
Commercial Code does not require consideration in the case of firm offers between
merchants. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-205.
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187, comment e, illus. 8, at 566; cf. Pritchard v.
Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882).
116. I believe that the Statute of Frauds, contrary to the assertion of the Restaten nt,
see § 187, comment g, at 568, also involves a strong policy, representing as it does a
legislative determination that certain kinds of agreements should not be enforced unless
the parties manifest their seriousness by giving the contract the required degree of
permanency. See International Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 382-83, 248
N.E.2d 576, 582-83, 300 N.Y.S2d 817, 826-27 (1969). The policy considerations applicable

to Statute of Frauds questions are discussed more fully in notes 156-63 infra and accompanying text.
117. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), Explanatory Notes § 187, comment g, at 568.
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Even though the forum law in question may represent a strong policy, the
forum will not refuse recognition to the express choice of law unless it has a
real interest in applying its law to implement the policy in the particular case.
In A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 118 for example, New York did not see
itself as having any real interest in applying its Statute of Frauds to protect
an Oregon corporation against a New York corporation in a dispute involving
a distributorship agreement."19 Suppose, however, that the contract had provided that there was to be no termination except for cause and Hyster claimed
that a subsequent oral modification gave it the right to terminate at will. New
York might then view differently its interest in applying its law to regulate
the transaction and, in this case, protect the New York distributor. If so, it
20
might not recognize the express choice of law.'
In practice, it will not ordinarily be possible to discover cases in which
the forum, despite a real interest in applying its own law, displaces its law in
response to an express choice-of-law provision. Indeed, the forum should allow
such displacement only when the matter at issue does not involve a strong
policy of the forum or when the forum has no real interest in applying its law
to implement that policy because of the particular circumstances of the case.
Conversely, when the parties expressly choose the law of the forum, but the
forum has no real interest in applying its law and another state does have a
strong policy interest, the choice of law should be denied recognition, and the
law of the interested state should be applied.' 21
Let me sum up my approach to contractual choice-of-law provisions as
follows: An express choice of law should be fully recognized as to matters
within the contractual capacity of the parties, because the parties are merely
incorporating the foreign law by reference and no choice-of-law issue is really
presented. An express choice of law should also be recognized as to matters
analytically beyond the capacity of the parties so long as these matters do not
involve a strong policy of the forum or another concerned state. An express
choice of law that would otherwise be recognized should not be denied effect
on grounds of "mistake" simply because the law chosen will invalidate the
contract or a part thereof. Likewise, it should not be refused recognition because of its adhesive nature, unless in the particular circumstances the adherent
could not be considered in any way to have made a choice of law.'22
My approach agrees with the Restatement's only as to matters within the
118. 3 N.Y2d 369, 144 N.E2d 371, 165 N.Y.S2d 475 (1957).
119. Compare id. with International Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y2d
372, 248 N.E2d 576, 300 N.Y.S2d 817 (1969). See notes 156-63 infra and accompanying
text.

120. The problem of an express choice of law and the Statute of Frauds could arise
only in a case such as Rampell in which there was a written agreement containing a
choice-of-law clause and an alleged subsequent oral modification.
121. A disinterested third state should likewise apply the law of the interested state,
irrespective of the express choice of law.
122. This would be limited to a case such as Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp.

465 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text.
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contractual capacity of the parties. I take a much more restrictive view as to
matters beyond their contractual capacity and would limit the effect of an
express choice to those issues that do not involve a strong policy of the forum
or of another concerned state. It is submitted, moreover, that this approach is
more in line with the actual practice of courts and provides a proper accommodation between the objective of protecting the legitimate expectations of the
parties and that of giving effect to the interests of the states concerned in
implementing the important policies reflected in their laws.

II.
A.

APPLICABLE LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE CHOICE

The State of the Most Significant Relationship:Localization and Implied
Intent

Where the parties have not made an effective choice of law, section 188
of the Restatement provides that, "[t] he rights and duties of the parties with
respect to an issue in contract are determined by the law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties."' 23 The state-of-the-most-significant-relationship test is
applicable to all matters-matters within the contractual capacity of the parties,
matters that do not involve a strong policy, and matters that do involve a strong
policy of the forum or another state. 24 In conception, it is a localizing rule
based on factual contacts. While policies are relevant in assessing the importance of these contacts, and while the choice of law may depend upon the
particular issue involved, nonetheless, the Restatement's basic premise is that
an agreement must be "most significantly related" to a particular state, and
this relationship can only be determined with reference to factual contacts. As
the drafters point out:
Frequently, it will be possible to decide a question of choice of law in
contract without paying deliberate attention to the purpose sought to
be achieved by the relevant contract rules of the interested states.
This will be so whenever by reason of the particular
circumstances one
1 5
state is obviously that of the applicable law. 2
Moreover, it is expressly provided that if the place of negotiation and the
place of performance are the same, that state will usually be the state of the
12
most significant relationship.
This form of approach does pose a fairly basic problem. Where a rule is
framed in terms of factual contacts, it is all too easy for whatever policy
considerations it embodies to be subordinated in the effort to localize the
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 188(1).
124. The only exception is for the details of performance. RESTATEM:ENT (SECOND)
§ 206. See id., Explanatory Notes § 188, comment e, at 580.
125. Id., Explanatory Notes § 188, comment c, at 578-79.
126. Id. § 188(3). See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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transaction in a particular state.' 2 7 Although the Restatement admonishes that
"[t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue," 128 there is, as Professor Weintraub warns:
grave danger that section 188 will be interpreted to direct the counting
of physical contacts with the parties and with the transaction and the
awarding of the palm to the state with the "most" contacts. To the
judge or lawyer, not expert in conflicts theory and working under
time pressures that prevent scrutiny of the Second Restatement in all
its detailed commentary on the black letter, this counting seems invited by section one eighty-eight's listing of contacts "to be taken
into account." It is the complete antithesis of functional analysis to
list any contact as "significant," a priori, without first knowing the
domestic law of the state129having that contact and the policies underlying that domestic law.
In discussing express choice of law, I drew a distinction between two
classes of issues that might arise during the litigation of an action in contract.
The first of these included both matters within the contractual capacity of the
parties and those that, while analytically beyond their capacity, do not interact
with any strong governmental policy. The second class was comprised of those
issues that do involve a strong policy either of the forum or of another interested state. Since the question of the applicable law in the absence of an
effective choice by the parties involves parallel considerations, the analysis
that follows, particularly as it deals with the "state of the most significant relationship" concept, will be made with reference to that same distinction.
As to the first category-where I favor party autonomy---"the state
of the most significant relationship" approach may have utility if it is viewed
as employing the methodology of localization to try to determine the implied
intent of the parties. Where it is possible to localize the contract in such a
way that it can be said that the parties did intend or would have intended,
if they had thought about it, that the law of a particular state apply, I think
it makes sense to look to the law of that state to determine matters that lie
within the contractual capacity of the parties and matters that do not involve
any strong policy.' 30 The justification is exactly the same as that for recognizing an express choice of law: to give effect to the expectations of the parties.
Here an argument can also be made in favor of finding validity whenever
127. To me, the "horror case" illustrating this point in the tort context is Dym v.
Gordon, 16 N.Y2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S2d 463 (1965). Dym was effectively
overruled in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S2d 519 (1969).
128. RESTATEmNT (SEcOND) § 188(2).
129. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 276-77.

130. Professor Reese has analogized the state of the most significant relationship
approach to the English "proper law of the contract" doctrine, see Reese, supra note 11,
at 537, which looks to the "system of law by which the parties intended the contract to be
governed, or, where their intention is neither expressed nor to be inferred from the
circumstances, the system of law with which the transaction has its closest and most
real connection." DICzY & oa-IS, supra note 99, at 561. The "proper law" doctrine thus
combines express and implied intent in a localizing rule.
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possible, since, unlike the express-choice-of-law situation, there would be
nothing to indicate that one or both of the parties made the choice in the hope
of subsequently being able to rely on the law of a particular state to invalidate

the contract or a part of

it.131

The "localizing-implied intent" concept is well-illustrated by the "classic"
English case of Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnais.J82 Two
English businessmen entered into a contract in England for the collection
of goods in Algeria and their transport back to England on the plaintiff's
ships. Payment was to be made in England. Due to an insurrection in Algeria,
the defendant was unable to deliver. Insurrection constituted the defense of
impossibility under Algerian law but not under British law. In a suit on the
contract in England, local law was applied as the law intended by the parties.
Whether the obligation was excused by impossibility was a matter within the
contractual capacity of the parties. It cannot be doubted that two English
businessmen, contracting in England for the shipment of goods there, intended
that English law rather than the "barbaric law" of a foreign country govern
their relationship. As the drafters observe in commenting on this case,

[t] hat A and B are both domiciled in X .... that the contract was
negotiated and executed in X and that delivery of the commodity was
to be made in X are factors which should lead the Z court'8 8 to the
conclusion that X is the state of dominant
interest, and that accord18 4
ingly X local law should be applied.
Where both parties have their principal place of business in the same state
and the contract involves their business activities there, it is reasonable to
assume that they expected or would have expected the law of that state to apply.
Another example is the "modern classic" case of Auten v. Auten,8 8 which
applied the state-of-the-most-significant-relationship test of the Restatement
(Second), although, as I have maintained elsewhere, this case did not really
involve a "contract" problem. 8 6 The parties were English domiciliaries;
the case involved a support agreement; and England was the marital domicile.
Payment was to be made to a New York trustee, who was to remit the money
to England. The only reason the contract was made in New York was that
the wife "caught up with" the husband there. The New York court talked
about England's interest in regulating the contract, but also emphasized that
the parties could not "have expected or believed that any law other than
England's would govern the effect of the wife's institution of a separation
131. See notes 91-99 supra and accompanying text.

132. 12 Q.B.D. 589 (C.A. 1884).

133. The likelihood of such a case arising in a disinterested third state is nil.
134. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), Explanatory Notes § 205, comment c, illus. 1, at 663
(footnote added).

135. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
136. See Sedler, Characterization,mipra note 42, at 86-88. See also Haag v. Barnes,
9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E2d 441, 216 N.Y.S2d 65 (1961).
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action.'8 7 The matter in issue-whether the institution of a separation action
abrogated the contract-was again one that could have been dealt with by
the parties in their agreement.
When the factual contacts are more divided, a finding in favor of validity
may properly tip the balance in determining the law "the parties intended or
should have intended." This is illustrated by still another "classic case,"
Pritchardv. Norton,188 which involved litigation over a contract of indemnity
entered into in New York by New York and Delaware defendants and a
Louisiana plaintiff. The contract was designed to cover the plaintiff's liability
as surety of an appeal bond that he executed on behalf of a railroad against
which a Louisiana trial court had entered a judgment. The railroad's appeal
was unsuccessful, and the surety was required to pay. The defense to his suit
against the indemnitors was that the agreement lacked consideration under
New York law. Consideration, while analytically going to validity, cannot
be said to involve any strong policy. 89 In denying the defense, the Court
tried to localize the contract in Louisiana, emphasizing that it was there that
the acts giving rise to the indemnitor's duty had occurred, and it buttressed
its conclusion with the argument that "the parties cannot be presumed to
have contemplated a law which would defeat their engagements."' 140
In the event that the factual contacts are so divided among various states
that it is not possible to localize the contract or any part of it in a given state-a
possibility that the Restatement does not seem to recognize' 4 -an alternative
solution is necessary. When the issue of validity does not trench upon a strong
policy, an argument can be made, as in Pritchard,for applying the law that
would validate the contract. Of course, as to matters purely within the contractual capacity of the parties, the law of the forum (as the basic law)
should always be applied in default of any reason for its displacement' 42
What I have proposed, therefore, with respect to matters within the
contractual capacity of the parties and matters not involving a strong policy,
combines the Restatement's express choice-of-law provisions and its state-ofthe-most-significant-relationship approach. When an express choice has not
been made, the localizing concept of the "state of the most significant relationship" would be employed to identify implied intent, and implied intent would
137. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 163, 124 N.E.2d 99, 103 (1954). Since the wife

was returning to England, it would have known that any action she might take would
have had to have been taken there.

138. 106 U.S. 124 (1882).
139. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
140. 106 U.S. 124, 137.
141. The assumption is that the disinterested forum will somehow always be able
to discover a state that, "with respect to the transaction and the parties," is the state of
the most significant relationship.
142. If the action is brought in a purely disinterested third state, the court should
probably look to the law of the "interested state" that most nearly resembled its own.
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be used to determine those matters that otherwise could have been determined
by a manifestation of express intent.
B. Localization versus Policy

Most cases, however, do not involve differing laws as to matters within
the contractual capacity of the parties or matters not involving a strong policy
of the forum or other concerned state. Instead they raise questions of the
Statute of Frauds, 14 the capacity of certain parties to enter into contracts,
the enforceability of particular kinds of contractual obligations, or the validity
of specific defenses. In general they present the conflict between a policy of
one state, which allows an agreement to be enforced, and a policy of another
state, which protects a party from contractual liability. Under the Restatement
approach, the localizing concept of the "state of the most significant relationship" is equally applicable to these cases. Although presumably policy considerations would be more important here, the emphasis is still on localization.
There is, I would submit, a very important difference between dealing with
such problems in terms of considerations of policy and fairness and trying to
solve them simply by the application of a localizing rule.
The difference can be illustrated by an analysis of the much-criticized
decision in Lilienthal v. Kaufman." An Oregon borrower secured a loan in
California from a local resident. When the borrower defaulted, the lender
discovered that prior to the transaction the borrower had been declared a
spendthrift in Oregon and had been placed under guardianship. Under Oregon
law the guardian could avoid the contracts of the spendthrift other than those
for necessaries, and in this case the guardian refused to pay the note. Upon
bringing suit in Oregon, the borrower was met with the defense of spendthrift
immunity, which the Oregon court had earlier sustained in a purely domestic
case involving the same defendant.' 4" In Lilienthal the defense was sustained
against the foreign lender as well.
The court stated that California law "governed" the contract as the law
of the state of the most significant relationship, since the borrower had ap..
proached the lender in California to ask for the loan, the money had been loaned
to him there, and by the terms of the note it was to be repaid there. The
court also cited the provision of section 188(3) to the effect that if the place
of negotiation and the place of performance are in the same state, that state
is generally the state of the most significant relationship. 140 It went on to
hold, however, that to apply California law would be against Oregon's "public
policy" and that the public policy of the forum was "so strong that the law of
143. As to the responsibility of the courts to implement the legislative policy with
respect to the Statute of Frauds, see the discussion in Currie, supra note 9, at 245-50.
144. 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964). See note 214 infra and accompanying text.
145. Olshen v. Kaufman, 235 Ore. 423, 385 P.2d 161 (1963).
146. The same provision was contained in section 332b(a) of the 1960 draft, to
which the court in Lilienthal referred.
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the forum must prevail although another jurisdiction, with different laws,
has more and closer contacts with the transaction." 147
In justifying the result, the court explicitly applied Professor Currie's
interest-analysis approach. 148 It saw California's interest as assuring that its
creditor be paid and upholding its reputation as a state where contracts could
be made with certain knowledge that they would be enforced.
Oregon's interest was in protecting the spendthrift and his family-what
I have called an anti-contractual policy149 -and the Oregon legislature had
determined that the policy of protecting the spendthrifts was more important
than the policy of enforcing contracts. Although Oregon also had an interest
in encouraging residents of other states to conduct business with Oregon
residents, this interest, in the words of the court, "was deflated by the recollection that the Oregon Legislature has determined, despite the weight of these
considerations, that a spendthrift's contracts are voidable." 15 0 In other words,
the policy to be implemented by the spendthrift statute was no different in the
foreign case from what it was in the domestic one, and the court recognized
the legislative determination in both cases. It resolved the true conflict 51 in
what Professor Currie contends is the only manner in which such a conflict
can rationally be resolved-by the application of the forum's law.' 52 In contrast,
under the state-of-the-most-significant-relationship approach espoused by the
Second Restatement, California law would have to govern in this case; the
conflicting interests would be resolved with reference to the factual contacts
that the contract had with the different states.'5
I submit that the approach of "judicial method and the policy-centered
conflict of laws," with interest analysis at its base, is a sound way to deal with
contract cases involving strong policies of the concerned states. It is true,
of course, that because of the possibility of reliance on the law of a particular
state and because of the common policy of all states to protect the legitimate
expectations of the parties and to insure the stability of interstate commercial
transactions, the displacement of the forum's law would be more frequent in
contract cases than, for example, in the tort area. The forum may be more
apt to conclude that the application of its law would be unfair or that the
147. 239 Ore. at 10, 395 P2d at 547. Under the traditional approach, the "public

policy" exception was limited to the refusal to entertain a claim created in another state.
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934). It did not justify the application of
the forum's law to the transaction.

148. 239 Ore. at 10, 395 P2d at 547.
149. See Sedler, Characterization,supra note 42, at 78-81.
150. 239 Ore. at 15, 395 P.2d at 549. The court also observed that each state had a
substantial interest that would be served or thwarted depending upon which law was
applied and that in such case, "the public policy of Oregon should prevail and the law
of Oregon should be applied." Id. at 16, 395 P2d at 549.
151. The conflict was between what I call the "family law" policy of Oregon and
the "contract" policy of California.
152. See B. Cu~IE, supra note 35, at 181-82.
153. For the problem posed by this approach, see notes 11-12 supra and accompanying
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conflict can be avoided by a more moderate and restrained interpretation of
its own policy and interest. 154 Nevertheless, where a true conflict is presented,
the forum should apply its own law, and in such a case the application of its
law is not likely to be unfair to the other party. The interest and fairness test
that I am proposing is, of course, completely distinct in orientation from the
new Restatement's state-of-the-most-significant-relationship test, although frequently it accords with the results reached by the courts that have been purporting to apply the Restatement rule. 55
Perhaps the best way to elucidate the implications of this suggested
methodology is by contrasting it with the approach taken by the Restatement.
This will be done through the analysis of a number of cases that illustrate
the key issues involved. When only one state has an interest in the application
of its law, and to apply the law of another state would frustrate that interest,
a false conflict is presented; in such a case, the forum should apply the law
of the only interested state. Among the contract precedents, this point is best
illustrated by IntercontinentalPlanningLimited v. Daystrom, Inc.,'5 0 involving
a claim for a finder's fee made by a New York broker against a New Jersey
corporation. The plaintiff was engaged in bringing together American and
European firms for the purpose of affiliation and merger. The defendant's
president admittedly agreed to pay a finder's fee if a relationship were established with a certain foreign firm, but the proposed merger did not take place
with the foreign firm, which was itself acquired by a larger company. The
latter, however, proceeded to merge with the defendant, and the plaintiff
contended that the defendant's president had orally agreed to extend the
brokerage agreement to encompass that merger. Under New York law, brokerage agreements came within the Statute of Frauds, and the original written
agreement would not have been sufficient to cover the new merger. New Jersey
had no applicable Statute of Frauds. The New York court applied New York's
Statute of Frauds to bar the suit.
The court stated that its approach to conflicts questions arising in contract
actions was to "'apply the policy of the jurisdiction "most intimately connected
with the outcome of [the] particular litigation" ,.1" It then considered the
policies and interests of both states. One of the policies behind the New York
154. Again, I am not assuming that the forum is a disinterested third state, because
this is generally an uncommon situation.
155. This lends credence to Professor Ehrenzweig's observation, see note 43 supra,

that the state-of-the-most-significant-relationship test can be employed to achieve any
result that the court desires. See also Phillips v. Englehart, 437 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. App.
1968) (The Missouri court found that the parties, an Iowa seller and a Missouri buyer,
"intended" to submit themselves to Missouri law, which protected the buyer by preventing

a complete forfeiture of the amount paid in upon repossession. Iowa law was to the
contrary.)
156. 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969).
157. Id. at 382, 248 N.E.2d at 582, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 825 (citing Auten v. Auten,
308 N.Y. 155, 161).
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Statute of Frauds, it said, was to protect principals in the sale of a business
interest from a finder's fee claim that is not supported by written evidence.
Since New York was an international center for the purchase and sale of
businesses, the state policy extended to foreign principals who utilized New
York brokers. Moreover, affording foreign principals the greatest degree of
protection against unsubstantiated claims of brokers would encourage the use
of local brokers, thus contributing to the economic development of the state.
Many of the negotiations in the instant case had occurred in New York; there
had been an advertisement in a New York newspaper; and the principals had
been introduced there. New Jersey, in contrast, had no interest in denying
protection to a New Jersey corporation against a New York broker. Therefore
a false conflict was presented, since the displacement of New York law would
defeat a legitimate interest of New York without serving any comparable
interest of New Jersey. 1r8
Daystrom may be compared with Denny v. American Tobacco Company.159
The plaintiff, a resident of California, solicited a finder's fee by sending a
letter to an officer of a corporation having its principal place of business in
New York, advising him that a California-based company might be for sale
and that he should call if interested. No answer was sent in response to this
letter, but the defendant eventually did acquire the California company. The
plaintiff sued in California, contending that his services were the procuring
cause of the acquisition and that he was entitled to recovery quantum meruit.
The defendant pleaded the New York Statute of Frauds, which would bar
any recovery, as in Daystrom. The California Statute of Frauds apparently
presented no obstacle to quantum meruit recovery.
The court first attempted to apply the state-of-the-most-significant-relationship test. However, after noting the factual contacts with both states, it
concluded that "[a] practitioner of the second Restatement would be hard
put to say which of these states had 'the most significant relationship' with
the 'contract' involved herein."' 60 It then moved into interest analysis. Conceding that both states might have an interest in applying their laws, it emphasized
that the plaintiff had told the defendant to answer only if he were interested,
that the answer would have to have come from New York, and that under
New York law there could be no liability for a finder's fee absent a written
agreement. It was of the opinion that while New York's interest in protecting
its residents from the sort of claim involved here was clear, California's interest
in allowing its residents to recover was much less apparent. In effect, it
advanced a more moderate and restrained interpretation of California's policy
158. See also Cavers, Conflict of Laws: Roundtable Symposium, 49 TEx. L.

211, 222-23 (1971) ; Sedler, supranote 43, at 228.
159. 308 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1970).

160. Id. at 222.

REv.
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and interest in order to avoid the conflict, and it consequently applied New
161
York law.
Under the analysis that I propose the imposition of liability under
California law would, in this situation, have been clearly unfair. The defendant
made no reply to the offer, and under New York law he could not incur
liability merely by taking advantage of the "tip." He did nothing to bring

himself within California law, so to speak, 0 2 and for this reason the application
04
03
of California law was, in a sense, not forseeable.1 As the court indicated,
it would be possible to say that New York was the state of the most significant
relationship to this issue. But the only reasonable justification for this conclusion would be that New York had a strong interest in applying its law,
California's interest was much less clear, and the application of California law
would have been unfair to the New York defendant. Localization in this
situation can come only as the product of interest analysis. Any initial effort
on the facts of Denny to localize the contract in either New York or California
merely obscures the important questions of policy and fairness upon which
the outcome should turn.
Lilienthal v. Kaufman, as previously noted,1 5 illustrates the clearest case
of a true conflict-between Oregon's "family law" policy of protecting spendthrifts and California's contractual policy of protecting the legitimate expectations of the parties to a commercial transaction. The Oregon court chose not
to subordinate its protective policy notwithstanding that the contract was
localized in California. 0 0 The result was indeed to defeat the expectations of
the California creditor, but it is doubtful if he was any more surprised than
the Oregon creditor who had also been met with this very unusual defense
in a prior action against the same debtor.167 On the other hand, I see a
difference between defeating contractual expectations in order to implement
very important "anti-contractual" policies, as in Lilienthal, and defeating those
expectations because of conflicting contractual policies. The very assumption
of the Oregon law involved in Lilienthal was that contractual expectations had
to be defeated in order to protect the spendthrift and his family. In contrast,
Denny involved conflicting contractual policies of New York and California;
161. The "more moderate and restrained interpretation of the forum's policy and
interest" was considered to have been the basis for the decision in Bernkrant v. Fowler,
55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961). See B. CumuE, supra note 35, at
688-89 n236. As the subsequent discussion will indicate, I have a somewhat different
explanation for the result in Bernkrant. See text accompanying notes 168-70 fnfra.
162. I am not, however, suggesting any notion of "submission to legislative jurisdiction." Cf. Scheer v. Rocknee Motors, 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
163. Cf. People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P2d 480 (1957).
164. 308 F. Supp. 219, 223 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
165. See notes 147-52 supra and accompanying text.
166. The Restatement suggests that when a party's domicile chooses to protect him,
the domicile might, in consequence, be considered the state of the most significant
relationship. But it does so quite grudgingly. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 198, comment
b, illus. 1, at 632-33.
167. See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
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and in the context of that case, it would have been unfair to apply California's

contractual policy to the New York defendant.
To illustrate this point further, suppose that an Oregon businessman enters
into an oral contract with a California businessman in California, the contract

to be performed in that state. When the Oregon party breaches, suit is brought
against him in Oregon. The contract is unenforceable under the Oregon
Statute of Frauds; it is valid under California law. In these circumstances,

the Oregon court should refuse to allow the defense.' 68 The policies behind
the Statute of Frauds are obviously contractual in nature, and all aspects

of the contract were connected with California. Although in terms of pure
interest analysis the case may appear to present a conflict of interests (Oregon
is interested in protecting its resident defendant, whereas California is interested in protecting its resident plaintiff and in upholding contracts made in

that state and to be performed there), there are no countervailing anticontractual policies that would justify the application of Oregon law, as there
were in Lilienthal. To put it another way, the court that decided Lilienthal

would not have found it to be against its "public policy" to enforce a California
contract that did not satisfy the Oregon Statute of Frauds.169 To refuse
enforcement of a contract satisfying the Statute of Frauds of the state where
it was to be performed in its entirety simply on the ground that the defendant
was a resident of the forum state would be fundamentally unfair to the plaintiff
and might well raise constitutional issues.'7 0
Different considerations are present, however, when a strong anti-contractual policy such as spendthrift immunity is involved, and the state of
the defendant's residence has a legitimate interest in applying that policy to
protect the defendant and his family. Because of that interest, it may require
the other contracting party, resident or non-resident, to suffer defeat of his
expectations. The localizing test of "the state of the most significant relationship" does not focus on these important policy differences and presumably
would require the same result in both cases because the contract was "centered"
in CaliforniaY1 Only a careful analysis in terms of interest and fairness will
permit the court to make this very necessary distinction' 72
The difference between a policy-centered approach and the Restatement's
localizing test is further demonstrated by a consideration of cases involving
7
oral contracts to will. The leading case in this area is Bernkrant v. Fowler.-'
168. See Sedler, Characterization,supra note 42, at 83-84.
169. See Lams v. F.H. Smith Co., 36 Del. 477, 178 A. 651 (Super. Ct. 1935);
Jackson v. Jackson, 122 Utah 507, 252 P.2d 214 (1953).
170. Cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) ; B. CURatM, sufpra note 35, at
232-33.
171. Both the negotiations and performance took place there, as the Oregon court
noted.
172. See A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 4, at 475-79 (distinguishing between different

kinds of incapacity).
173. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
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The plaintiffs were Nevada residents who had acquired an apartment building
in that state, giving a purchase money mortgage for about $33,000. The seller,
a California resident at the time of his death (and for purposes of the point
in issue assumed to have been one at the time of the agreement), wanted the
buyers to refinance the transaction. He orally stated that he would "make a
sporting proposition" and provide in his will that any debt remaining at the
time of his death would be forgiven and cancelled in exchange for a partial
payment and refinancing of the obligation.174 The requested financing was
carried out, which reduced the debt by some $13,000, at an out-of-pocket cost
to the plaintiffs of approximately $800. A year-and-a-half later the seller died,
and his will neither forgave the debt nor directed cancellation of the notes.
The plaintiffs then brought suit in California, seeking cancellation of the
obligation.
Under Nevada law the oral contract was found to be enforceable, but
it was assumed to be invalid under the California Statute of Frauds applicable
to provision by will. The court refused to apply the Statute of Frauds despite
an apparent interest in protecting California estates from false claims. It
emphasized that the contract had been made in Nevada, performed by the
parties in that state, and involved the refinancing of obligations arising from
the sale of Nevada land and a debt secured by this land. The court referred
to the common policy of both states to protect the reasonable expectations of the
parties and concluded that, because California would have no interest in
applying its Statute of Frauds until the death of the promisor, the plaintiffs
were not bound to know that California's statute might ultimately be
invoked against them. Unless they could rely on [Nevada] law,
they would have to look to the laws of all the jurisdictions to which
[the promisor] might move regardless of where he was domiciled
when the contract was made. 175
Professor Currie hailed the decision in Bernkrant as an example of
moderate and restrained interpretation of the forum's policy and interest,
demonstrating that "the method of governmental interest analysis need not
necessarily produce egocentric or provincial results."'1 76 In this instance, application of the Restatement's technique would have produced an identical
result. Certainly Nevada would be regarded as the state having "the most
significant relationship" under the principles of section 188, since all the factual
contacts relating to the transaction were massed there.
But consider the following hypothetical situation: 177 The decedent, a
rich California widow, had a summer home in Nevada where she spent ap174. 8 Cal. Rptr. 326, 328 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).

175, 55 Cal. 2d at 596, 360 P2d at 910, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 270 (1961).
176. B. Ctnuu, supra note 35, at 688-89 n236.
177. This case is similar to Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895),
with the elimination of all other factual contacts with the decedent's domicile.
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proximately four months each year. In Nevada she orally agreed with the
plaintiff, a local resident who had never set foot in California and had no
intention of going there, that if the plaintiff would keep house for her during
these summer visits, she would leave the plaintiff half of her estate by will.
The arrangement continued until the decedent's death five years later. The
decedent did not include the promised bequest in her will, and the plaintiff
brings suit against the executor in California to enforce the oral contract
to will. The executor, as in Bernkrant, asserts the California Statute of
Frauds applicable to provision by will.
Is this case sufficiently like Bernkrant so that California should apply
Nevada law and allow the claim? Under the state-of-most-significant-relationship approach it is virtually identical, since the factual contacts are once again
massed entirely in Nevada. In terms of policy and interest, though, it is a very
different matter because it involves a true contract to will, which Bernkrant,
on closer analysis, did not.178 The purpose of a rule prohibiting oral contracts
to will would seem to be to prevent the decedent from passing a portion of his
estate (and thus disappointing his heirs) unless he executes a document
satisfying the requirements of a formal will. But the decedent in Bernkrant
was not in fact trying to pass anything to the plaintiffs by will. He was
engaged, in his words, "in a sporting proposition," and he hoped that he
would live long enough for the entire debt to be repaid during his lifetime.
Thus the Bernkrant transaction should be regarded as an ordinary business
arrangement for the refinancing of a mortgage, with the addition of a contingent
provision forgiving the debt by will if the decedent "loses his gamble."
Certainly it should not be viewed as a transaction of the kind with which
the legislature was concerned when it enacted the Statute of Frauds applicable
to provision by will.17 9 If the problem is examined from this perspective, 80
it is apparent that California has no legitimate interest in applying its Statute
of Frauds to a contractual arrangement that was connected solely with
8
Nevada.1'
In the hypothetical case, however, the decedent was obviously attempting
to pass a portion of her estate by the oral agreement-the very act that the
legislature was seeking to prevent by means of the Statute of Frauds. Because
the court is dealing with an actual contract to will, it must be concerned with
implementing the decedents' estates policy reflected in the statute, a policy
178. See Sedler, Characterization,supra note 42, at 92-94.
179. Perhaps this "promise to will" was within the letter of California's Statute of
Frauds; but this may be questioned. See id. at 93. In a purely domestic case it is
conceivable that a court, if forced to confront the specific question, would decide that
the transaction did not involve a contract to will within the meaning of the statute
because the decedent did not really intend to make a testamentary disposition.
180. As to identification of the problem area generally, see Sedler, Characterization,
supra note 42, at 42-48.
181. This case raises the same policy issues as the hypothetical example involving
the Oregon Statute of Frauds. See notes 168-70 supra and accompanying text.
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that deliberately frustrates the expectations of the contracting parties in order
to protect the decedent's heirs. Nevada, on the other hand, may have an
interest in applying its law so as to enable the Nevada resident to recover
on the oral agreement, which would have been valid in his home state 18 2
In this situation a true conflict is presented, and California, as the forum state,
might be expected to apply its own law.183
The difference between Bernkrant and the hypothetical case lies in the
distinction between an essentially commercial agreement and a true contract
to will.'5 4 Nevertheless, in both cases the factual contacts are the same, and
each contract is centered in Nevada. If the drafters of the Restatement wish
to imply that in the case of true contracts to will the state of most significant
relationship under section 188 will necessarily be the decedent's domicile,
they should say so; but they do not. 8l 5 Moreover, there is nothing in the
Restatement's methodology that tells a court how to distinguish between these
two situations, which are quite different although the factual contacts with
the respective states are the same. In contrast, a policy-centered approach
makes this distinction abundantly clear and enables the court to focus on
the differing policies and interests of the respective states in the two situations.
This kind of policy analysis was employed by a California intermediate
appellate court in Younker v. Manor.'8 s A deficiency action was brought against
a California corporation that bad guaranteed a note for the purchase of Nevada
land. California had a statute barring deficiency judgments; Nevada did not.
The plaintiffs argued that all of the significant contacts were in Nevada: the
note had been executed there, it was payable there, and the land was situated
there. In refusing to entertain the action, the court distinguished between the
"real property" aspects of the transaction, which had already been subject to
Nevada law by the foreclosure proceeding, and the deficiency or "personal"
aspects. With respect to the latter, California's policy was to protect buyers
of land from personal judgments. Thus the state had an interest in applying
that policy to "protect the solvency" of the California defendant. Assuming
Nevada had an interest in allowing its residents to obtain the maximum
recovery, its policy conflicted with that of California. The court, in applying
California law, emphasized that there was no unfairness to the creditor,
especially in light of evidence that the plaintiff had believed at the time of the
transaction that Nevada law also prohibited deficiency judgments. 87 More
182. See Sedler, Characterizatiom, stepra note 42, at 94-95. I question whether Nevada

should apply its law here.
183. See notes 13 & 101 supra and accompanying text.
184. As to the "commercial" nature of the contract in such a situation, see IL
WmNTRAuB, supra note 1, at 288-91.
185. It does not discuss contracts to will separately, but refers to Bernkrant and
Emetry as "cases of particular interest involving the statute of frauds in a choice of law
setting." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)

§ 199.

186. 255 Cal. App. 2d 431, 63 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1967).
187. It was claimed that the president of the defendant corporation had been told
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importantly, at all times the plaintiff had known that the defendant was a
California corporation 8l and that its principal assets were located there. It
does not seem unfair to require the plaintiff in these circumstances to be aware
of the California anti-deficiency statute, and thus California could legitimately
apply its own law.
In a similar vein is the decision in PotlatchNo. 1 FederalCredit Union v.
Kennedy. 8 9 A Washington marital community was sued in their home state
by an Idaho creditor on a note that the husband had executed as surety for his
brother. The note and the co-maker's statement had been prepared by the
plaintiff at its Idaho office, and the funds had been transferred to the debtor
there. Under Washington law, community property was not liable for the
suretyship debt of one of the parties unless the community had benefited by
the obligation, which was not the case in this instance. Idaho law was to the
contrary. The Washington court had previously adopted the state-of-the-mostsignificant-relationship rule'9 0 and purported to apply it in the Potlatch case.
It emphasized, however, that the contacts with the respective states were
merely "guidelines indicating where the interests of particular states may
touch the transaction in question."' 9' The court then proceeded to approach
the case in terms of interest and fairness and concluded that Washington had
a clear interest in applying its law, a true policy conflict having arisen. Since
the Idaho creditor had known that he was dealing with Washington residents
and that most, if not all, the community property was located there, the application of Washington law would not give rise to any unfairness. 192 On the
issue of the community's liability, therefore, Washington was conceded to
be the state of the most significant relationship. This case illustrates how
the new Restatement test of most significant relationship can be used to
98
justify an analysis that has been carried out in terms of interest and fairness.'
In light of this essentially post hoc application, one may well ask whether the
Restatement's methodology has any independent utility. Indeed, it would be
far more advantageous for the courts to proceed on the basis of interest
by the plaintiff that "'there was nothing to worry about because the law was just like
in California in regard to personal liability on purchase money deeds of trust.'" This
was denied by the plaintiff. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 433, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
188. It was on this basis that the court distinguished Bernkrant. Id. at 438, 63 Cal.
Rptr. at 202.
189. 76 Wash. 2d 806, 459 P2d 32 (1969).
190. Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 893, 425 P.2d
623 (1967) ; Pacific States Cut Stone Co. v. Goble, 70 Wash. 2d 907, 425 P2d 631 (1967).
In both of these cases the issue was whether community property was subject to an
obligation incurred by Washington residents. Since Washington law made it subject
to that obligation, no conflict of any sort was presented. It was therefore unnecessary
for the court to delve into an analysis of the state-of-the-most-significant-relationship rule.
See R. WEiNTmAit, supra note 1, at 278-80.
191. 76 Wash. 2d at 810, 459 P.2d at 35.
192. See Sedler, Characterization,supra note 42, at 89 rL333.
193. See R. WEINTRAt , mpra note 1, at 276-77.
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analysis from the outset, without struggling to bring their reasoning artificially
within the framework of the Restatement (Second).
One area in which the outcome under the Restatement's methodology
clearly coincides with the result under an interest-and-fairness approach is that
of life insurance. Here strong regulatory policies are present, 19 4 and the
insured's domicile will apply its law to protect him from what it regards as
overreaching on the part of the insurer. 95 By the same token, where the insured is not entitled to protection under the law of his domicile, it is reasonable
to deny him such protection. 90 The law of the insured's domicile can be
ascertained and relied on by the parties, and the domicile is undoubtedly the
most concerned state.' 97 Recognizing this, the Restatement says that the
domicile of the insured is presumptively the state of the most significant
relationship as to life insurance contracts. 9 8 The same approach can be taken
with respect to accident insurance. 99 In the case of group life insurance,
however, it is proper to look to the law of a single state to determine the
rights of all the members of the group. As a practical matter, there will usually
be an express choice of law in the master contract, and this choice will be
200
recognized by the state of the insured's domicile.
In areas other than life insurance contracts, the Restatement's approach
-maintaining that the state of the most significant relationship governs
contractual obligations and presumptively defining that state by a catalogue
of rules-is less helpful. Under section 193, for example, the "principal
location of the insured risk" is presumed to be the state of the most significant
relationship in casualty insurance contracts. As to automobiles the principal
location of risk is said ordinarily to be the place where the automobile is
garaged.2 01 But consider a situation such as that found in Haines v. Mid194. Thus, as pointed out earlier, an express choice of law will not be recognized.
See notes 107-10 supra and accompanying text.

195. See, e.g., Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960).
196. See, e.g., Fleet Messenger Serv. v. Life Ins. Co., 315 F2d 593, 597 (2d Cir.
1963).
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 192, comment c, at 601-02;
A. EnuNzwEiG, supra note 4, at 515-16.

198. Restatement (Second) § 192.
199. See, e.g., Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22
(1961) ; Johnston v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 242 S.C. 387, 131 S.E.2d
91 (1963). The Restatement states that the principal location of the insured risk with
respect to accident policies will usually be in the state of the insured's domicile. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), Explanatory Notes § 193, comment b, at 611.
200. See Detroit Greyhound Employees Federal Credit Union v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
7 Mich. App. 430, 151 N.W2d 852 (1967) ; Kahn v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 61
Misc. 2d 918, 307 N.Y.S2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1970); cf. Boseman v. Connecticut General
Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 192,
comment h, at 605-06. As Professor Ehrenzweig has stated:
Group insurance contracts are usually freely negotiated between the insurer and
representatives of the group. Provisions contained in such contracts, including
stipulation of an applicable law are therefore subject to the Rule of Validation.
For "the master policy rather than the certificate sent to the insured member
is generally held to be the contract of insurance."
A. EHaENZWEIG, supra note 4, at 512 (footnote omitted).
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 193, comment b, at 611.
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Century Insurance Co. 202 The events in that case occurred in a "functional
socio-economic and mobility area"203 consisting of LaCrosse, Wisconsin and
LaCrescent, Minnesota.2 04 At the time of the accident, the parties-husband
and wife-lived on the Minnesota side of the state line, and their automobile
was garaged there. The husband worked on the Wisconsin side, however,
and the insurance contract had been negotiated and executed in the insurer's
office there. The contract contained a family exclusion clause, which at the
time of contracting was valid under Minnesota law but invalid under Wisconsin
law. The accident occurred in Wisconsin. The wife brought suit against her
husband in Wisconsin and joined the insurer under Wisconsin's direct action
statute. The insurer moved to dismiss in reliance on the family exclusion
clause. Wisconsin had previously characterized validity of a family exclusion
clause as a "contract problem, ' 20 5 and the question was whether Wisconsin or
Minnesota law applied to this issue. By the time of the suit the wife had
apparently separated from her husband and taken up residence on the Wisconsin
side of the line. Also, Minnesota had changed its law in the interim by adopting
a statute invalidating such exclusionary provisions. The court purported to
apply the state-of-the-most-significant-relationship test but interpreted it to
authorize interest analysis in a case of this nature. In its discussion, the court
rejected the idea that the automobile in this case could be said to have a single
principal location in either state20 6 and went on to observe that "[a]t best
the significant contacts are split between the two states." 20 7 At this point, it
took a pure policy-centered approach, treated the case as a true conflict, and
applied Wisconsin law as the "better law. '208
Although Minnesota's invalidation of family exclusion provisions minimized its interest and the plaintiff's change of residence strengthened Wisconsin's interest, it is doubtful that either of these changes affected the
choice-of-law decision. In view of Wisconsin's policy of allowing recovery to
202. 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W2d 328 (1970).
203. See Sedler, The TerritorialImperative: Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 394, 398-99, 407-08 (1971)'
204. See 47 Wis. 2d at 449, 177 N.W2d at 332.
205. See Urhammer v. Olson, 39 Wis. 2d 447, 159 N.W2d 688 (1968).
206. The Restatement appears to take a contrary position, suggesting that the place
where an insured automobile is garaged is ordinarily to be regarded as the location of
the risk. RESTATEMENT (SEcoN.D), Explanatory Notes § 193, comment b, at 611. But see
id., comment a, at 610. (With regard to vehicles used as interstate carriers, "[tihere may
be no principal location of the insured risk.")
207. 47 Wis. 2d at 450, 177 N.W2d at 332. The place of negotiation and place
of contracting were in Wisconsin. The place of performance was "equally divided,"
and the location of the subject matter was in both states. Minnesota was the domicile
of the parties.
208. 47 Wis. 2d at 451, 177 N.W2d at 333. The "better law" has been applied by
Wisconsin courts when it is Wisconsin law that is "better." See Conklin v. Homer,
38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W2d 579 (1968) ; Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W2d
664 (1967). However, in Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968),
involving a true conflict as to limitation of damages for wrongful death, the court
applied Wisconsin law even though it was not the "better" one. When a court applies
the "better law," that law, not coincidentally, is usually its own.
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all persons injured within its borders,209 it had an interest in applying local
law. Minnesota's interest was to protect its insurer. In the case of a true
conflict, the forum can be expected to apply its own law. Here the application
of Wisconsin law was certainly not unfair to the insurer, which had its office on
the Wisconsin side, and which, in any event, could be expected to foresee
the application of either state's law in that functional socio-economic and
mobility area. The state-of-the-most-significant-relationship test again was of
no assistance to the court in arriving at its decision. If anything, it was a
hindrance, an unhelpful ritual that had to be performed before the court could
proceed to analyze the problem meaningfully in terms of interest and fairness.
When the insured has changed his domicile after the execution of the
contract, Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.210 makes it clear that his new
domicile may constitutionally apply its own law to protect him against the
insurer. The new domicile is justified in doing so because of its interest in
safeguarding the welfare of its residents (or, in the case of life insurance, in
carrying out their beneficial intentions). There is no unfairness to the insurer,
who could foresee the change of domicile.2 1 '
My fundamental thesis is that the interest and fairness test, which serves
to define the constitutional dimensions of choice of law in contract cases, as
in all others,2 should also be employed to make the basic choice-of-law
decision as to all matters involving a strong policy of the concerned states.21 8
In actual practice, those courts that have abandoned the "place of contracting"
rule of the original Restatement are generally employing the interest-and-fair209. See Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W2d 579 (1968).
210. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).

211. See RESTATEMNT (SEcOND), Explanatory Notes § 193, comment d, at 613. In
Quarty v. Ins. Co. of North America, 244 So. 2d 181 (Fla. App. 1971), the court held
that the Florida statute involved in Clay, which invalidated built-in limitation periods,
did not apply. The insured was not a resident of Florida at the time of the loss, but
had moved to Florida by the time of the suit. As to the applicability of the law of the
insured's new residence to automobile insurance contracts, compare American Service
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bottum, 371 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1967), with Employers' Liab. Ascurance
Corp. v. Aresty, 11 App. Div. 2d 331, 205 N.Y.S2d 711 (1st Dep't 1960), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d
696, 180 N.E2d 916, 225 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1962), and Security Ins. Group v. Emery, 272
A.2d 736 (Me. 1971).
212. See generally Sedler, supra note 203, at 402-04. The last case in which the
Supreme Court, by a 5-4 decision, held unconstitutional a state court's choice of law,
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) involved insurance
contracts between a fraternal benefit association and its members. The Court held that,
as a matter of full faith and credit, the law of the state where the association was
organized had to govern in order to guarantee equality of treatment among the members.
Id. at 610. There is a distinction, I think, between the rights of a member under the
insurance contract and the liability of members for statutory assessments. In Supreme
Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915), the Court first enunciated
the principle that a uniform law had to apply to assessments of this nature. In terms
of interest and fairness, there is no reason why the policyholder's home state should
not be able to apply its law invalidating built-in limitations provisions, and it is doubtful
whether Wolfe would be decided the same way today.
213. Another example of the situation where the forum will apply its own law in
order to implement a strong nolicy is the matter of covenants not to compete. See, e.g.,
Credit Bureau Management Co. v. Huie, 254 F. SuDp. 547 (E.D. Ark. 1966); Davis v.
Ebsco Indust., Inc., 150 So. 2d 460 (Fla. App. 1963).
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ness test to resolve questions that touch upon significant governmental interests.
They may pay lip service to the state-of-the-most-significant-relationship test;
but as Haines and the other cases indicate, this formulation often proves an
obstacle to arriving at a proper result. When presented with a true conflict,
the courts have almost invariably ended by applying their own law, as illustrated
by Lilienthal, Younker, Potlatch, and Haines. This is so despite academic
criticism 214 and the suggestion of numerous alternatives for resolving true
conflicts.215 On the other hand, because of the common policy of protecting
the legitimate expectations of the parties and insuring stability in interstate
commercial transactions and a concern with fairness to non-resident contracting parties, the courts are more disposed to try to avoid the conflict by a
moderate and restrained interpretation of their own policy and interest, as in
Bernkrant and Denny. The state-of-the-most-significant-relationship test, with
its amalgam of contacts and policy, merely obscures the real issues. Where
strong policies are involved, an approach in terms of interest and fairness is
a much more realistic way to analyze the problems and is far more likely to
produce sound results.
III.

CaOICE

OF LAW IN CLAImS OF USURY

The approach of judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws
seems to me particularly appropriate for dealing with claims of usury. Usury
laws favorable to debtors reflect a strong policy of protecting necessitous borrowers against overreaching on the part of lenders, who are usually economically stronger.216 This is certainly true of most consumer loans. We should,
however, draw a distinction with regard to commercial loan transactions, in
which bargaining power between the parties is generally equal.2 17 This distinction between consumer and commercial loans is recognized in the laws of
many states, which either preclude corporations from asserting the defense of
usury or allow higher interest rates for corporate borrowers.2 18 On the other
hand, where corporations are permitted to defend on grounds of usury, the
state policy protecting commercial borrowers may be fully as strong as that
designed to shelter individuals.
The states have employed widely divergent sanctions to deal with usury,
D.

214. As illustrating the almost universal academic criticism of Liliemthal, see, e.g.,

CAVERS, THE CHOIcE or LAw PRocEss 189-93
215. See, e.g., id. ch. 7; R. WErNTRAUB,

(1965).

supra note 1, at 284-92. Professor
Ehrenzweig's rule of validation approach would, of course, be another way to resolve
true conflicts. Interestingly, he notes that in international cases the forum is more likely
to invalidate contracts in order to implement its own policy. See A. EHRENZWEiG, supra
note 4, at 486.
216. See generally Comment, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of Lex
Debitoris, 55 CALr. L. REV. 123, 126-37 (1967).
217. See id. at 200-02, 206-09; A. EHRRNZWEIG, sup.ra note 4, at 482-84.
218. See Comment, supra note 216, at 207-08, and the review of state laws in id.
at 207 n.441.
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and the nature of the sanction as well as the permissible rate of interest may
demonstrate the "strength" of a state's policy against usury. Some states merely
deprive the lender of the excess interest and fully enforce the contract as to
220
Still
the remainder of the loan. 19 Others require a forfeiture of all interest.
others require the lender to disgorge a multiple of the interest charged or
taken2 21 At the other end of the spectrum, some states (including New York)
hold that the contract is completely unenforceable, resulting in a forfeiture of
the entire interest and principal. 222 Approximately one-third of the states also
impose criminal penalties. 23 When a state has a strong policy against usury,
it has an interest in applying its own law to implement that policy whenever
it has a legitimate occasion for doing so. Appropriate situations will arise, for
example, when the borrower is a resident of the state or when the lender has
its principal place of business there.2 4
The Second Restatement's approach to usury not only ignores the policy
and interest of concerned states, but goes so far as to abandon the state-ofmost-significant-relationship formulation, under which at least some consideration can be given to the policies reflected in differing laws. In its place, section
203 of the Restatement substitutes a "rule of validity" that provides:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of
usury if it provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state
to which the contract has a substantial relationship and is not greatly
in excess of the rate permitted by the general usury law of the state
of the otherwise applicable law under the rule of § 188.225
A "substantial relationship" may be found in any state where the borrower is
domiciled, where the loan is to be repaid, where the lender has his principal
place of business, or where the loan was negotiated. The only qualification is
that these contacts cannot be "manipulated."2 26
The contrast between the Restatement's approach and one based on
interest and fairness may be illustrated by the following example. The maximum rate of interest under the law of the borrower's state is 6%7o; under the
law of the lender's state it is 8%o. The note was made and is payable in the
lender's state. The negotiations preceding the loan occurred in the borrower's
state. In terms of interest analysis, this case would appear to present a true
conflict. The lender's home state is interested in allowing him to charge the
219. See id. at 232 n.567.

220. See id. at 232 n.569.
221. See id. at 233 nn.570-71.
222. See id. at 233 nn.572-74.
223. See id. at 233 n.575.
224. When the lender has his principal place of business in a state, and some of
the events took place there, that state has an interest in applying its law in favor of a
non-resident borrower in order to implement the admonitory policy reflected in that
law. See notes 257-58 infra and accompanying text
225.

RESTATEmENT (SECOND)

§ 203.

226. See id., Explanatory Notes § 203, comment c, at 651-52.
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maximum rate permitted under its law, and the borrower's home state is
interested in protecting him from what it considers to be the rapacity of
economically superior lenders. The law of either state is "foreseeable" by the
parties because the loan transaction has factual connections with both states.
Certainly the borrower's home state is justified in applying its own law. But
under the Restatement's approach, since the contract bears a "substantial
relationship" to the lender's state, under whose law it is not usurious, the
borrower's state would be expected to subordinate its own protective policy
2 27
and to apply the law that would uphold the contract.
While conceding that "usury laws are designed to protect a person against
the oppressive use of superior bargaining power and thus represent an important policy of the enacting state, '228 the Restatement justifies its rule of validity
on the ground that:
[O]rdinarily, the permissible rate of interest will vary only slightly
from state to state. Upholding a contract against the charge of usury
by the application of the local law of one state, which has a substantial
relationship to the transaction and the parties, can hardly affect
adversely the interests of another state when the stipulated interest
is only a few percentage points higher than would be permitted by
the local law of the other state.2 9
This is a rather strange assumption to make at a time when a fractional change
in interest rates produces substantial fluctuations in the stock market and sends
economists and investors looking for portents of economic growth or decline.
It becomes ridiculous when applied to anything other than a very short-term
transaction. One may ask whether the drafters of the Restatement, if offered
a home mortgage loan at 8% instead of 6%, would assume that the difference
in interest rates would "hardly affect their interests." Even if this were only
a ten-year loan of $10,000, a 2% differential would mean an added payment
of between $1100 and $2000 (depending upon whether interest was calculated
23 0
on the declining balance method)-an additional 117 to 20% of principal.
Moreover, the difference in the permissible rate of interest is not merely
a difference in detail. Depending upon the amount of permissible interest and
the nature of the sanction employed, it represents a policy judgment whether
to favor borrowers or lenders as a class. 2 31 All states have a policy of allowing
interest. They also have in common a policy of imposing some limitations on
the lender's power to exact such interest. But where the line is drawn between
227. See id., Explanatory Notes § 203, comment c, illus. 4, at 652.
228. Id., comment e, at 653-54. The Restatement also says that an express choice of
law is not relevant, but only because of the "liberality of the present rule." Id. at 653.
229. Id., comment b, at 650. Professor Weintraub agrees with this analysis. See
R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 286-87.
230. See also Comment, supra note 216, at 229.
231. The majority of states have maximum rates between 6% and 12%. B. CUtRRAN,
TRENDS IN CONSUMR CREDIT LEGISLATION 15 (1965). Far from supporting the conclusion
that the difference in usury laws is "one of detail," such a differential demonstrates to me
a policy judgment whether to favor lenders or borrowers.
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these competing policies and the nature of the sanction employed in response
to a violation cannot be treated as inconsequential; these are important policy
judgments having significant economic and social consequences. 82 A state such
as New York, which allows only 6% and provides that usurious contracts
are completely unenforceable, has made a policy judgment favoring borrowers
as a class over lenders. If a New York borrower enters into a contract with a
lender from a state that allows 10% interest and provides that only excess
interest is forfeited, the conflict between New York's obvious policy of favoring
borrowers and the other state's equally obvious policy of favoring lenders is
not a mere "difference in detail." The conflict between the policy of borrower
protection and the policy of lender protection has been recognized with respect
to small loan laws,2 33 even by the Restatement,2 3 4 and the same conflict exists
between general usury laws that differ in the rate of interest and in the sanctions employed. In no sense can the rule of validity be justified in usury cases
on the ground that these differences "can hardly affect adversely the interests"
of a concerned state.
The real reason for the rule of validity, as the practice of courts indicates,
relates more to the difference in sanctions than to the "similarity" of interest
rates. In the "leading case" purportedly establishing the rule of validity,
Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co.,2 85 the loan was usurious under the
laws of both states (New York and Pennsylvania) to which the transaction
bore a "substantial relationship." Under New York law, usurious contracts
are, as previously indicated, completely unenforceable. Under Pennsylvania
law only the mildest sanction, forfeiture of excess interest, is imposed. The
"rule of validity" that the Court ostensibly followed in applying Pennsylvania
law was, in effect, a rule that the lender was entitled to escape with the lightest
sanction.
In the more recent case of Crisafulli v. Childs,20 again involving New
York and Pennsylvania, the New York court was more candid in admitting
what it was doing and why. The loan was a commercial rather than a consumer
transaction and involved the financing of a $35,000 cooling machine. If New
York law applied, the borrower would receive a "windfall" in the amount of
$15,000. If Pennsylvania law applied, the borrower would have to pay that
sum, subject only to a deduction of $165 representing excess interest already
paid. The court related the rule of validity to the difference in sanctions and
observed that:
232. See Comment, supra note 216, at 245-46.
233. See R. WEINTRAIM, supra note 1, at 287. See also Personal Fin. Co. v. Gilinsky

Fruit Co., 127 Neb. 450, 255 N.W. 558 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 627 (1935) ; Standard

Agencies, Inc. v. Russell, 100 Ohio App. 140, 135 N.E.2d 896 (1954) ; cf. Kinney Loan &
Fin. Co. v. Sumner, 159 Neb. 57, 65 N.W.2d 240 (1954).

234. See

RESTATEmENT (SECOND),

Explanatory Notes § 203, comment

f, at 654. The

Restatement leaves open whether the rule of validity would be applied by the courts to
small loan laws.
235. 275 U.S. 403 (1927).
236. 33 App. Div. 2d 293, 307 N.Y.S.2d 701 (4th Dep't 1970).
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[T]he application of the rule would produce a just result herein.
The voiding of the contract would result in a windfall to plaintiffs of
the sum of $15,000 in addition to the $5,000 discount they received on
the purchase price of the machinery by reason of the loan. It is
recognized that "It is the necessitous individual who is protected by
legislation against usury, because the power of the lender to relieve
the borrower's needs creates the opportunity for oppression." But
such is not this case. Plaintiffs apparently were represented throughout by an attorney. The original contract of purchase and sale with
Eastern provided that the prospective loan should carry an annual
interest rate of 10%o. It was not, however, until the loan, providing
for such rate, and one payment thereon, had been made that plaintiffs
suddenly7 discovered that the agreement possibly could be invalidated.23
As Crisafulli indicates, the real purpose of the rule of validity is probably to
protect lenders as a class from what the courts regard as harsh forfeiture provisions found in the laws of some states.2 s The case also demonstrates that the
stakes can be very high when the sanctions differ, and it may be asked just
how many cases do arise where the difference is merely one of rates rather
&28 9
than of sanctions.
Professor Ehrenzweig, a strong proponent of the rule of validity generally,
says that the usurious contract is "probably the most important case in which
that rule does -notapply." 240 His approach to usury questions is to apply the
law of the forum (which will usually be the borrower's home state) unless for
some reason the lender was entitled to expect the application of the law of a
state with a more liberal rule.241 It has also been argued that, "in the absence
of an overriding policy to the contrary," the law of the borrower's domicile
should be applied in all cases between parties from different states2 4
There is certainly no justification for applying a rule of validity to protect
lenders as a class from heavy sanctions imposed by the legislature of a concerned state. In Crisafulli the court viewed the borrower as seeking an "undeserved windfall." But it must not be forgotten that the lender was at the
same time attempting to exact a rate of interest that it knew to be usurious
under the laws of both New York and Pennsylvania. It seems to me that the
borrower's conduct in trying to void the agreement and thereby obtain the
"windfall" was no more "reprehensible" than the lender's efforts to secure an
illegal rate of interest in the first place. The policy of New York, as reflected
in its usury laws, was specifically to allow the borrower to obtain this "windfall" in order to deter such conduct on the part of the lender. In a purely
domestic case, the New York court would be required to implement the
237. Id. at 297, 307 N.Y.S2d at 705 (citations omitted).
238. See Comment, supra note 216, at 235-36 n.586.
239. See id. at 236-37.
240. A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 4, at 482.
241. Id. at 484. The borrower would also not be protected where he was a resident
of a state with a more liberal law.
242. Comment, supra note 216, at 183, 250-52.
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legislative policy. 243 However, because a foreign element was present, the court
was able to thwart this policy. It has been contended that the "courts in those
states with heavy forfeiture provisions have generally strained to avoid imposing forfeitures upon foreign lenders." 244 In analyzing this process, one
commentator has noted:
The result is paradoxical: The stronger a state's legislative policy
against usury, the more apt the courts are to disregard that policy. As
the punitive sanctions become increasingly stringent, it is correspondingly easier for a foreign lender to evade them with impunity.
With a kind of perverse logic, a court's unwillingness to overturn a
transaction grows with the amount of the loan and the usurious interest taken. Although many courts might be persuaded to enforce the
forfeiture of a few hundred dollars, few could be persuaded to declare
a forfeiture of many thousands. Ironically, if the lender is careful to
extract usurious interest upon comparatively large loans, his invulnerability is virtually guaranteed. Heavy as the increase in the borrower's burden of payment may be under the loan contract, it is far
outweighed by the court's abhorrence of an even greater forfeiture
accompanied by a correspondingly large windfall to the borrower.245
Stated simply, the courts are demonstrating their preference for lenders as
a class by enabling them to avoid severe forfeiture provisions. To accomplish
this they will go so far as to uphold a contract that is patently usurious under
the law of the state with the more severe sanction. Even if this goal of preventing forfeitures is regarded as justifiable, it could certainly be achieved
less disingenuously than by invoking the rule of validity. To do so, the court
would declare the contract invalid, as is done when it is found to be usurious
under the laws of both states. However, the less severe sanction would be
applied, as in Crisafulli, on the ground that this "would produce a just result
herein." 246 In any event, the policy to protect lenders as a class in interstate
loan contracts should be stated explicitly and candidly, rather than being
obscured by the application of a so-called rule of validity.
If the rationale for the rule of validity is that the difference in permissible
interest rates is merely a difference in detail, 247 that justification is economically
unsound and ignores the practical effect of the divergent policies that may be
reflected in the differing interest rates and sanctions. If, on the other hand,
243. See id. at 234 & nn.580-81.
244. Id. at 235.
245. Id. (footnotes omitted).
246. 33 App. Div. at 297, 307 N.Y.S2d at 705. In effect, the court would be applying
the law of the forum insofar as it made the transaction usurious and the law of the other
state as to the penalty. Cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y2d 34, 172 N.E.2d
526, 211 N.Y.S2d 133 (1961). Since the basic lav is the law of the forum, it is not
required to. incorporate the "whole law" of another state, but can fashion a rule of
decision, using as a model some of that law in combination with its own law. See Cook,
The Loical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.. 457, 480-85 (1924).
Sealso Sedler, supra note 13, at 31-34.
247. This, of course, is the position taken by the Restatement (Second). See notes
228-30 supra and accompanying text.
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the justification is that the lender should be protected from severe sanctions,
it may be asked why he should be given more protection in interstate loan
contracts than he is afforded in domestic transactions. No convincing answer
has ever been given or even attempted, and the practice of the courts may
simply reflect a bias in favor of lenders as a class.
It is far more reasonable to deal with usury cases in terms of policy and
fairness, and this is especially important in view of the very strong policy that
usury laws often represent. The forum should apply its own law where it has
a real interest in doing so-for example, where the borrower is a resident of
the forum or the lender has his place of business there. At the same time an
effort should be made, as in all contract cases, to avoid conflicts by a more
moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of one state.
This is particularly true where there may be some danger of unfairness if the
law of one or the other state is applied. This approach can be illustrated by a
consideration of some usury cases in which the policies and interests of the
concerned states were fairly clear.
In Trinidad Industrial Bank v. Romero,248 the lender was a Colorado
corporation which maintained its principal place of business in the state. The
borrowers, residents of New Mexico, executed a note secured by New Mexico
property. Two and one-half years later-after the borrowers had missed two
payments-the lender telephoned them and requested a "side note" to take
account of the past due payments. One of the borrowers obtained a promissory
note and a deed of trust form at the lender's office in Colorado and took them
across the state line, where they were signed in blank by the other borrower.
They were then taken back to the office in Colorado and signed, after which
the lender filled in the amount due. The second note provided for 10% add-on
interest (i.e., 10% of the principal amount borrowed multiplied by the fiveyear term of the loan) ; this amount was then broken down into sixty equal
monthly payments. This resulted in an effective rate of interest on the unpaid
balance of 10% for the first year, 12.5% for the second year, 17%o for the
third year, 25% for the fourth year, and 50% for the principal remaining due
at the beginning of the fifth year. Suit was brought in New Mexico on the
second note, which was clearly invalid under New Mexico law. The lender
asserted that the interest charged was permissible under Colorado's usury
statutes. The court purported to apply the Second Restatement test of section
203 (2) and found that New Mexico was "the state of the otherwise applicable
law." Concluding that the rate of interest was "greatly in excess of that allowable under our [New Mexico] law," 249 it declared the note invalid. The New
Mexico statute specifically prohibited add-on provisions and provided for the
forfeiture of all interest where the contract was usurious. The transaction was
248. 81 N.M. 291, 466 P2d 568 (1970).
249. Id. at 295, 466 P.2d at 572.
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exactly the kind that the statute was designed to prohibit; New Mexico's
interest in applying its law to protect its domiciliary borrower was clear; and
the application of its law was certainly not unfair to the Colorado lender, who
had entered into a loan contract secured by New Mexico land.
Now let us suppose that the case had arisen in Colorado and that under
Colorado law the add-on provisions were valid.250 Under the Restatement
approach, since the rates were "greatly in excess" of that allowed by New
Mexico, it would be necessary for Colorado to decide whether New Mexico
was the state of the most significant relationship.2 1' There were substantial
factual contacts with both states, and Colorado, if it desired to apply its law,
could plausibly argue that it was the state of the most significant relationship.
That kind of analysis, however, obscures the real issue: whether Colorado will
allow its lender to obtain a much more favorable rate of interest than could a
New Mexico lender when dealing with New Mexico borrowers in a transaction
secured by New Mexico land. Colorado might well decide to adopt a more
moderate and restrained interpretation of its own policy and interest and to
apply New Mexico law. But if it were to apply Colorado law, there would be
no "fundamental unfairness," since the borrowers were aware that they were
dealing with a Colorado lender, and the negotiations and performance were
2 52
connected with both states.
Similarly, in Oxford Consumer Discount Co. v. Stefanell252 the borrowers, residents of New Jersey, obtained a loan on the security of their home
from a Pennsylvania lender not authorized to do business in New Jersey. The
note was executed at the lender's office in Philadelphia. The New Jersey court
held that the loan was subject to the provisions of the applicable New Jersey
statute, under which the interest was excessive and the contract completely
unenforceable. Under a corresponding Pennsylvania law, the contract was
fully valid. In holding that New Jersey law was applicable, the court looked
to the legislative policy reflected in the statute and concluded that the legislature intended it to be applicable to all loans secured by New Jersey realty.254 ;
250. We will assume either that the borrower was personally served there or was

subject to jurisdiction under a "long-arm" statute.
251. New Mexico, applying the Restatement rule, assumed that it was that state.
252. Raton, New Mexico and Trinidad, Colorado are in close proximity and presumably make up a functional socio-economic and mobility area. See note 193 supra.
253. 102 NJ. Super. 549, 246 A2d 460 (1968), rehearing granted and decree modified,
104 N.. Super. 512, 250 A.2d 593 (1969), modified and affd, 55 N.J. 489, 262 A.2d 874,
appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 808 (1970).
254. The court considered whether the statute contained a "directive on choice of law"
within the meaning of section 6(1) of the Restatement (Second) and concluded that it
did not. The court also examined the Restatement rule of section 195, to the effect that
the state of the most significant relationship with respect to contracts for the repayment
of money is ordinarily the state where repayment is to be made. It then referred to the
"relevant policies of the forum" and concluded that it would follow this guideline, "not
merely because it was embodied in the Proposed Official Draft but for the reason that it
is inherently sound." Id. at 563, 246 A2d at 467.
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It also rejected the lender's rather specious argument that application of the
2 55
New Jersey statute was unconstitutional
Both of these cases involved consumer loans, and in each of them the
borrower's home state had a strong interest in applying its law to protect him
against overreaching on the part of a foreign lender. Because of this interest,
it may be expected that the courts of the borrower's home state will pay little
deference to the less stringent requirements of foreign usury laws and that
they will not be swayed by arguments in favor of a rule of validity.256 Similarly,
when the contract is usurious under the laws of both states, and the borrower's
state imposes a heavier sanction, its courts should also apply local law to
implement the strong legislative policy reflected by that sanction.
When the contract is usurious under the law of the lender's state but
not under the law of the borrower's state, a different kind of analysis is called
for. It may be urged that the lender's state has an interest in applying its law
against him-at least if the transaction was entered into there-in order to
implement the admonitory policy reflected by its law. By the same token, it
might be argued that the borrower's state has an interest in applying its law to
allow the out-of-state lender to recover in order to encourage the making of
loans to its residents. In Lyles v. Union PlantersNational Bank of Memphis, 25 7
the lender was a Tennessee bank with a branch office on the Arkansas side of
the state line. It was there that the contract was signed and that the note was
to be paid. At the time of the execution of the contract, the borrower lived in
Tennessee; by the time of suit he had moved to Arkansas, where the action
was instituted. The note covered the financing of an automobile that had been
purchased in Arkansas. Under Arkansas law, the contract was usurious and
completely unenforceable. The court applied Arkansas law, but solely on the
ground that the contract had been made there. This case has been analyzed in
terms of borrower protection, and it has been argued that while Arkansas
might have been justified in applying its law as to the rate of permissible
interest because of the borrower's change of residence, it was not justified in
255. Id. at 566-76, 246 A2d at 469-74. The lender relied on equal protection, due

process, interstate commerce and full faith and credit. These arguments were clearly
specious under the interest and fairness test. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S.

179 (1964).

256. See, e.g., Jones v. Tindall, 216 Ark. 431, 226 S.W2d 44 (1950); Atlas Subsidiaries, Inc. v. 0 & 0 Inc., 166 So. 2d 458 (Fla. App. 1964). In both of these cases the
lender mistakenly included a choice-of-law provision looking to the law of the borrower's
home state. Under the Second Restatement rationale this would not matter-it was presumably inserted by "mistake"--and the rule of validity would operate to rectify it. The

Restatement treats Atlas as a case in which the other state was one that had "no sub-

stantial relationship to the contract." ]RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 203,
comment c, at 655. The borrower had its home office in Pennsylvania and the note was
made payable there. This element of the obligation could be said to have been "manipulated," but, on the other hand, it seems a logical place for payment to be made. It is

doubtful that the result would have been any different had "more occurred" in Pennsylvania.

257. 239 Ark. 738, 393 S.W2d 867 (1965).
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applying its more severe sanction on that basis. 2 58 I disagree with this view and
would contend that Arkansas should have applied its law even if the borrower
had not moved to that state. Arkansas should not allow branch offices of outof-state banks to exact a higher rate of interest than purely local banks can
charge. Whenever a court perceives an admonitory policy behind the usury
law-as indeed it should when, as here, severe sanctions are imposed-that
policy should be applicable to all lenders who transact business in that state,
irrespective of the residence of the borrower. On the other hand, when the
forum's usury law imposes a mild sanction, such as forfeiture of excess interest,
it can be contended that an admonitory policy is not present and that if the
250
contract is valid under the law of the borrower's state, it should be enforced.
There is a heavy enough burden imposed in holding the lender to a different
standard when he deals with a foreign borrower in the latter's home state.
When the situation is reversed, even the courts of the borrower's state should
enforce no more stringent limitations than the lender would face in his home
state-where, after all, the transaction occurred.
Another question of significance is whether there are circumstances in
which the borrower's home state should not apply its law for his protection. It
has been held that when the borrower seeks out the lender in the latter's home
state, the lender should be able to charge the locally permissible rate of interest.
In Dairy Equipment Co. of Utah v. Boehme,200 an Idaho buyer was unable
to secure local financing for the purchase of dairy equipment for his farm. The
Utah seller obtained the financing from a Utah bank,2 1 the contract was
executed in Utah, and payments were to be made there. The Idaho court,
emphasizing that there was no intent to evade Idaho law, upheld the contract
under Utah law.62 I agree with the result. This is a case calling for a moderate
and restrained interpretation of the forum's policy and interest. Though it
might not be "fundamentally unfair" to hold the Utah lender to Idaho law,
since he knew where the buyer resided,2 3 it does seem that the lender should
be able to rely on the standards established by the law of his home state when
he makes no attempt at out-of-state solicitation. 2 64 It has been contended that a
distinction should be drawn between consumer borrowers and those whose
bargaining power may be equal to that of lenders, and that the former need
the protection of their home state even when they have solicited an out-of-state
loan.26 5 While this may be true, the position of the lender must also be con258. See Comment, sepra note 216, at 247-49.

259. Contra,id. at 190-92.
260. 92 Idaho 301, 442 P2d 437 (1968).
261. The facts are set out at length. Id. at 302, 442 P.2d at 438.
262. Accord, Whitman v. Green, 289 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1961).
263. See Comment, supra note 216, at 243-44.
264. See A. EuRENZWEIG, CoNFLIcTs IN A NUTSHELL 179-80 (2d ed. 1970).
265. See Comment, supra note 216, at 244-45.
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sidered. The lender was acting in accordance with his state's standards, and he
was not soliciting in the buyer's state in the hope of making a profit there.
On the other hand, where the out-of-state lender solicits business in the
borrower's home state, the borrower's state should apply its own law. In
Burr v. Renewal Guaranty Corp.,26 6 a Colorado corporation advertised its
loans in trade journals. An Arizona borrower responded to the advertisement,
and the loan was negotiated by mail.26 7 The note was usurious under Arizona
law, but not under Colorado law. The Arizona court applied the new Restatement's rule of validation and upheld the note, observing that neither bad faith
nor intent to avoid the application of Arizona law had been shown 2 68 This is
a closer case. If the lender had maintained a branch office in Arizona and had
solicited loans through local newspaper advertisements, Arizona would have
considered this a domestic case and applied its own law.2 69 If there had been
direct mail solicitation, a similar result might have followed, based upon a
strong policy against usury 270 But here there was no direct solicitation of
Arizona residents. Instead there was a general solicitation in a magazine -of
nationwide circulation. Viewed in this light, the result may be justified. Nevertheless, the case should have been approached in terms of these considerations
rather than disposed of by the facile invocation of a rule of validity.
Most of the cases considered thus far have dealt with consumer rather
than commercial borrowing, 271 and it may be asked whether a different approach should be taken when a corporate or "experienced individual" borrower
is involved. My view is that it should not. If a corporation is precluded from
asserting the defense of usury by the law of its state of incorporation (or,
more realistically, by the law of the state where it has its principal place of
business), there is certainly no reason to allow it to assert the defense when
sued on a "foreign" obligation. 27 2 But when the law of the corporation's "home
266. 105 Ariz. 549, 468 P2d 576 (1970).
267. The advertisement appeared in a life insurance trade journal. The lender
specialized in loans to life insurance salesmen secured by commissions earned by them
but not yet due from their companies. The borrower was a life insurance salesman who
had accrued future commission rights. The note was prepared in Colorado and sent to the
borrower in Arizona together with an assignment of his future commissions. He signed
the documents there and returned them by mail to the lender, who then mailed its check
to him. There was an express provision for the application of Colorado law.
268. It emphasized that the lender had charged less than it was entitled to under
Colorado law. 105 Ariz. at 559, 468 P.2d at 577.
269. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Explanatory Notes § 203, comment c, at 651; cf.
Lyles v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 239 Ark. 738, 393 S.W.2d 867 (1965).
270. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 192.
271. Crisafulli v. Childs involved commercial borrowing, which, as the court indicated,
may have influenced the decision. 33 App. Div. 2d 293, 297, 307 N.Y.S2d 701, 705 (4th
Dep't 1970).
272. This would certainly be true of individual borrowers. The fact that the state
where the loan was transacted allowed corporations to assert the defense could not in
itself be said to represent an admonitory policy apart from the usurious nature of the
transaction. If the loan was not usurious under the law of that state, the state would
have no interest in applying its law to implement its usury policy.
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state 2 73 would allow it to assert the defense and the transaction is usurious
under that state's law, should the home state's policy be put aside in an interstate case merely because the borrower is a corporation?2 7 4 It has been asserted
that in practice this is exactly what has happened,275 and the result is said to
be justified on the ground that the lender and the corporate borrower are likely
to have equal bargaining power 2 7 6 Yet this approach is highly questionable.
The policy reflected in the law of the corporation's home state is that commercial borrowers do need protection against usury. Thus, the state's interest
in applying its law is no weaker in the case of a corporation than in the case
of an individual. Indeed, the interest may be stronger, since the legislature
may also have been concerned about the outflow of corporate capital in the
form of debt service payments to foreign lenders. The only difference that I
see between the consumer and the commercial borrower is that when a corporation is involved, the forum may be more disposed to a moderate and
restrained interpretation of its own policy and interest because of the equality
of bargaining power between the borrower and the lender 277 But it should
only do so on that basis and should not apply a blanket rule of validity to
commercial loans, in disregard of established legislative policy.
In summary, the rule of validity in usury cases cannot be justified either
on the ground that the difference in interest rates is not significant or on the
assumption that courts should avoid the imposition of heavy sanctions against
the lender in an interstate loan situation. When the contract is usurious under
the law of the forum and the borrower is a resident of the forum, the forum
should apply its law to protect him, except if the borrower sought out the
lender in the lender's home state and the lender was entitled to rely on the
law of that state. When the contract is not usurious under the law of the
borrower's state but is usurious under the law of the lender's state, the result
may depend upon whether the law of the lender's state represents a strong
admonitory policy, as reflected by the imposition of a severe sanction. If it does
not represent such a policy, the defense of usury should not be sustained, since
the only state interested in protecting the borrower does not do so.278 When
an admonitory policy is clear, however, the lender's state may have a real
273. This would be the state where it had its principal place of business or where
its activities in connection with the loan were conducted.
274. For these purposes, "experienced individual borrowers" may be equated with
corporations.
275. See Comment, .supranote 216, at 210-11.

276. Id. at 212-14.
277. See Consolidated Jewelers, Inc. v. Standard Fin. Corp., 325 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.
1963) ; cf. West Side Motor Express, Inc. v. Finance Discount Corp., 340 Mass, 669, 165

N.E2d 903 (1960).
278. In terms of interest analysis, this would be considered the unprovided-for case.
Since both states have a policy of upholding transactions and neither state has an interest
in applying its law to protect the borrower, this common policy should be upheld and the
defense denied. For a discussion of such an approach in the context of the defense of
incapacity, see B. CnuRRr, supra note 35, at 90-92.
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interest in applying its law to effectuate that policy if some of the events
occurred there. Conversely, the borrower's state may have an interest in allowing the out-of-state lender to recover under its more liberal law because it
wishes to encourage the in-flow of foreign capital. 279 An analysis of usury
problems by this method, it is submitted, will produce sound results by
enabling the courts to focus on the important considerations of policy and fairness. A rule of validity is totally irrelevant and merely serves to obscure the
real issues.
CONCLUSION

In this article I have sought to analyze the approach of the Restatement
(Second) to the solution of contracts problems against the backdrop of my
own view of judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws. The
Restatement distinguishes between the case in which the parties have made an
effective express choice of law and the situation in which they have not. It
would fully uphold the parties' express choice of law as to matters within their
contractual capacity and would also uphold it as to matters beyond their
contractual capacity with certain limited exceptions. When the parties have
not made an effective choice of law, it would determine all questions-both
those involving matters within the contractual capacity of the parties and
matters beyond their contractual capacity-with reference to the concept of
the most significant relationship. That concept represents an amalgam of policy
considerations and factual contacts; but it is enunciated in the form of a localizing rule, emphasizing factual contacts.
As I have suggested, a proper solution of contracts problems requires that
one distinguish between, on the one hand, matters within the contractual
capacity of the parties or matters that (while analytically beyond their contractual capacity) do not involve any strong policy and, on the other, matters
involving a strong policy of the forum or other concerned state. As to the
former, I would give effect to the parties' express choice of law in all cases,
except that, as to matters theoretically outside their contractual capacity, I
would not recognize such a choice where one party could not be considered in
any way to have assented to the choice. But since I would not recognize
express choice of law as to any matter involving a strong policy, my approach
in this regard differs markedly from that of the Restatement.
When the parties have not made an express choice of law, the state-of-themost-significant-relationship concept is useful only insofar as its localizing
methodology can be used to determine implied intent. Whenever possible, I
would utilize implied intent in the same manner as I would employ express
choice of law-to determine matters within the contractual capacity of the
279. As previously indicated, usury laws may have significant economic consequences.
See text accompanying notes 227-30 supra.
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parties and matters that do not involve any strong policy. Most cases, however,
will involve significant policy considerations, and here I would submit that the
localizing approach of the state-of-the-most-significant-relationship rule merely
serves to obscure the real issues. I would decide those cases, as I would any
other, with reference to considerations of state policy and fairness to the parties. However, because of the possibility of reliance on the law of a particular
state and because of the common policy of all states to protect the legitimate
expectations of the parties and to insure the stability of interstate commercial
transactions, the displacement of the forum's law will be more frequent in the
contracts area than, for example, in tort cases. Nonetheless, in the case of a
true conflict, the forum should apply its own law if no unfairness would result
to either party. Finally, I would deal with usury cases on this same basis,
without reference to what I believe a completely unjustifiable rule of validity.
If contracts is "the most complex and confused area of choice of law
problems," 0 the complexity and confusion is not obviated by the approach
taken in the Restatement (Second), and indeed, may even be compounded by
it. I fear, however, that my own efforts may have been no more successful. In
the final analysis, we can perhaps do no better than to recall the words of
Justice Roger Traynor:
The responsible court will have to be on its mettle. It must be prepared to reject unrealistic rules, yet cautious enough not to make
formulations that reach too zealously into the future or give too
zealous a scope to local policy. It must distinguish between real and
spurious conflicts at the outset. It must temper its freedom to declare
local policy and its scope with a sense of harmonious interstate relations as well as for the justifiable expectations of the parties.281
These words are particularly applicable to the responsibility of a court when
confronted with a case in which a contract has cut across state lines.
280. See note 1 supra.
281. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REv. 657, 675 (1959).

